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Summary  findings
De Melo and Denizer examine monetary policy in 26  The use of credit ceilings was helpful in the year of
transition countries in Europe and Central Asia from  stabilization, especially in the Central and Eastern
1989 to 1995.  European countries. The elimination of credit controls
In a socialist economy money and credit are largely  was associated with effective stabilization.
determined as a residual. In a market economy monetary  Policy stance, as measured by base money growth and
policy plays an active role in economic management and  the real discount rate, was effective in helping to reverse
economic efficiency is believed to be improved by variety  undesirable inflation and disintermediation trends. But
and sophistication in financial instruments.  the relationship between effectiveness and market
De Melo and Denizer classify these 26 countries by the  orientation  of monetary policy instruments is less clear.
extent of market orientation  in the use of instruments of  Financial depth is associated with the elimination of
monetary policy, by indicators of policy stance, and by  credit ceilings and the development of markets for
broad measures of effectiveness. They evaluate these  government paper, and inflation is associated with the
three dimensions by cross-country comparison over the  elimination of directed credit and the establishment of a
transition period and at the time of stabilization. They  market-oriented  refinancing window. The overall index
find several clear patterns.  of the market orientation  of monetary policy instruments
By the end of 1994 slightly fewer than half the  is negatively related to inflation, but the direction of
countries were relying mainly on market-oriented  causality is unclear.
monetary instruments. More than half exhibited low to  On balance, inflation control and financial depth seem
moderate reliance on them. Countries that quickly  to be more directly related to policy stance, which is in
formulated a monetary policy response after the break  turn related to broader structural reform.
from central planning were more likely to switch to  Monetary stability goes hand in hand with adjustment
market-oriented  instruments.  in the real sectors. Subsidies and central bank support of
Central and Eastern European countries moved more  public enterprises to help maintain employment and
rapidly than countries of the former Soviet Union toward  output are ultimately financed by creating money,
these instruments.  reducing the options for market-based monetary policy
regardless of how market-oriented the monetary system.
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Introduction
This  paper  looks  at  monetary  policy  in  26  transition  countries  in
Europe  and  Central  Asia from  1989  to  1995.  The purpose  is to provide  a
broad  characterization  of the  experience  of these  countries  as  they  make
the  transition  from  a  socialist  economy,  where  money  and  credit  were
largely  determined  as  a residual,  to  a  market  economy,  where  monetary
policy plays  an  active  role in  economic  management  and  where  economic
efficiency  is  believed  to  be enhanced  by the  variety  and  sophistication  of
financial  instruments.  In the  process,  we classify  countries  by the  extent
of  market-orientation  in  the  use  of  monetary  policy  instruments,  by
indicators  of policy  stance,  and  by  broad  measures  of effectiveness.  The
relationships  between  these  three  dimensions  are  evaluated  by  cross-
country  comparison  over  the  transition  period  and  at  the  time  of
stabilization.
To  place  the  discussion  in  context,  Section  A reviews  briefly  the
nature  of money  and  finance  under  socialism  and  provides  a  snapshot  of
various  financial  development  ratios  at  the  beginning  of  transition.
Section  B  discusses  countries'  policy  response  to  transition  and
distinguishes  two  groups--one  where  a  monetary  policy  framework  was
quickly  developed  as  part  of the  economic  transformation  strategy  and
another  where  continued  participation  in  the  ruble  zone  and  greater
ambivalence  toward  reform  resulted  in delayed  stabilization  programs.
In  Section  C, we look  at  how monetary  policy has  been  conducted.
The  focus  is  on  the  use  of  specific  policy  instruments,  for  which  we
identify  "late  socialism",  "transitional",  and  "market-oriented"  forms.  We
. We  appreciate  comments  from  Jerry  Caprio,  Stijn  Claessens,  Nikolay
Gueorguiev, Francoise  Le Galle, Piroska  Nagy, Fabio Schiantarelli,  and  Ulrich
Zachau  on an earlier draft.  We thank  Nikolay Gueorguiev and  Kenneth  Xu for
their valuable  research  assistance.then  classify  countries  by  the  extent  of market-orientation  in  their  use  of
both  direct  and  indirect  instruments.  In  order  to  facilitate  comparability,
we  look  at  market  orientation  of  monetary  instrument  use  around  a
common  event,  namely  stabilization,  and  make  some  observations  about
similarities  and  differences  across  countries.
Section  D  classifies  countries  against  some  crude  indicators  of
policy  stance  and  two  broad  indicators  of  effectiveness,  namely  price
stability  and  financial  depth.  And  in  Section  E,  we  look  at  the  interaction
between  instrument  use,  policy  stance,  and  effectiveness.  The  purpose  is
to  see  to  what  extent  the  use  of  instruments  and  policy  stance--rather
than  non-monetary  factors  such  as  changes  in  international  terms  of
trade,  trade  and  exchange  rate  policies,  and  the  behavior  of banks--have
affected  economic  outcomes.  Section  F concludes.
The  standard  caveats  on  data  deficiencies  apply  to  this  overview,
which  covers  countries  affected  by  regional  conflicts  and  blockades  as
well  as  those  free  of  such  disruptions.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to
provide  comparable  data  across  countries,  but  the  quality  and  the
availability  of  data  vary  substantially.  High  inflation  in  most  countries
raises  questions  about  both  the  estimates  of  changing  prices  and  the
deflation  methods.  Also,  since  estimates  of average  stocks  of  Ml  are  not
available  for  some  countries,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  distinguish
between  movements  in  Ml  and  M2.  For  all  these  reasons,  the  emphasis
below  is  placed  on  broad  trends  which  appear  to  be  robust.
A. Money  and  Finance  Under Socialism
Money  under  socialism  passively  accommodated  the  financing
needs  of  the  central  plan,  which  emphasized  production  in  the  real
sectors.  As  is  well  known,  central  plans  set  production  targets  specified
in  physical  units  in  each  sector  to  ensure  a  target  growth  rate  for  the
economy.  The  emphasis  on  growth,  given  labor  force  and  technology,
required  new  investment;  and  planners  determined  the  level  of  sectoral
investment  using  investment  coefficients  derived  from  detailed  input-
output  studies.  An  investment  plan  was  then  produced  by  aggregating
the  sectoral  investment  needs. 2
The  role  of the  financial  sector  was  to  fulfill  the  investment  plan  as
well  as  other  financing  requirements  of  the  state  enterprises  and  the
2  See Alec Nove (1991) for a fuller  description.
2government  budget_all  included  in  the  credit  plan,  the  financial
counterpart  to  the  physical  targets.  Planners  set  targets  in  real  sectors
and  financial  flows  were  adjusted  to  achieve  them.  The  central  credit
plan  operated  like a global  directed  credit  scheme;  interest  rates  were  not
a  factor  in  the  mobilization  and  allocation  of  resources,  much  less  in
managing  aggregate  demand.  Money  was  not  a  policy  instrument,  and
therefore  most  instruments  of  monetary  policy  found  in  market
economies  were  not  used.
However,  this  did  not  mean  money  and  credit  were  unimportant.
For  price  stability,  planners  had  to  ensure  a  balance  between  money
supply  and  output.  To  attain  this  balance,  the  system  was  split  into
cash  and  non-cash  sectors.  Non-cash  transactions  between  enterprises
were  accounting  entries  within  the  financial  system  and  had  no  effect  on
the  money  supply.  Cash  transactions  were  undertaken  by  households,
who received  their  wages  in  cash.  The equality  between  the  wage  bill and
consumption  goods  valued  at  administratively-fixed  prices  was  a  key
condition  for  the  equilibrium  of the  system.  To  the  extent  that  wages
paid  by  the  authorities  exceeded  expenditures  on  goods  sold  by  state-
owned  enterprises_often  in  short  supply-money  would  be  printed  to
finance  the  gap,  generating  inflationary  pressures  (see  Sahay  and  Vegh
1995  for a model  of money  and  prices  under  socialism).
Similarly,  the  financial  assets  of enterprises  and  households  were
maintained  separately,  even  though  they  were  all  nominally  part  of the
mono-bank  system  characteristic  of socialism.  Household  deposits  were
virtually  all  directed  to  the  Savings  Bank;  the  financial  assets  and
liabilities  of  enterprises  were  almost  entirely  held  by  commercial  and
sectoral  banks.
In  sum,  the  financial  institutions  that  implemented  the  central
bank's  credit  plan  were  passive.  They  had  no  role  in  credit  allocation,
and  the  basic  legal,  accounting,  and  regulatory  systems  found  in  market
economies  were  not  in  place.  Knowledge  of  enterprises  accounts  and
investment  projects  was  typically  located  in  the  central  planning  agency,
not  in  the  banks.  With  this  set  of initial  conditions,  it is  not  surprising
that  improvements  in  resource  allocation  from  financial  intermediation
have  been  slow in  transition  economies  (Caprio  1995).  We inquire  below
whether  instruments  of monetary  policy  used  in  market  economies  can
be introduced  into  such  an  environment  quickly  and  effectively.
By the  beginning  of political  transition--roughly  1989  for  most  of
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE) and  1991  for the  Former  Republics  of
3Yugoslavia  (FRY)  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU),  basic  financial
ratios  in  socialist  countries  were  relatively  high,  as  shown  in  Table  1.
Only  in  Poland  and  the  FRY,  where  inflation  was  high  in  the  late  1980s,
were  overall  ratios  of M2 to  GDP  low.
But  financial  depth  did  not  necessarily  indicate  financial
development,  as  it  does  in  market  economies.  Rather,  part  of  the
accumulation  of  financial  assets  in  the  banking  system  reflected  a
growing  disequilibrium,  particularly  after  the  mid-1980s,  as  wages  were
raised  more  rapidly  than  the  availability  of  consumer  goods.  This  was
especially  the  case  in  the  FSU.  With  limited  consumption  possibilities,
people  had  no  choice  but  to  convert  part  of  their  incomes  into  bank
deposits.  These  forced  savings  resulted  in  a  sizeable  monetary  overhang
in  most  socialist  countries  at  the  time  of the  collapse  of central  planning
(see  Balcerowicz  and  Gelb  1995  for estimates  of the  monetary  overhang).
B. The  Policy  Response  to  Transition
Countries  can  be  classified  roughly  into  two  groups  based  on  the
speed  of  their  policy  response  to  the  break  from  socialist  central
planning.  The  first  group,  referred  to  here  as  the  "fast  response"  group,
consists  of  most  CEE  countries  (except  FYR  Macedonia  and  Romania),
the  Baltics,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Moldova.  These  countries  developed
a  monetary  policy  framework  as  part  of  their  economic  transformation
strategy  relatively  quickly.  As  indicated  by  the  date  of  adoption  of  a
stabilization  program  shown  in  Table  2,  monetary  or  exchange  rate
targets  were  put  in  place  within  the  first  two  years  of transition,  with  the
declared  objective  of regaining  price  stability.
Among  this  group,  relatively  tight  monetary  policy  was  not  seen  as
contradictory  to  adjustment  in  the  real  sector.  In  fact,  the  early  adoption
of  a  stabilization  program  appears  to  be  intimately  linked  to  broader
reform  strategies,  as  these  countries  are  virtually  the  same  as  those  that
have  been  elsewhere  classified  as  advanced  and  high  intermediate
reformers  on  economic  liberalization  (see  de  Melo,  Denizer,  and  Gelb
1996).  Money  and  credit  targets  were  designed  in  conjunction  with  the
imposition  of  hard  budget  constraints  and  enterprise  reforms,  an
important  element  of success  (Bruno  1993).
While  the  objectives  of  this  group  were  similar,  the  design  of
monetary  policies  differed  _  most  visibly  in  the  choice  of  a  nominal
anchor.  For  example,  Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  and  Estonia  adopted
4stabilization  programs,  backed  by  IMF  stand-by  arrangements,  based  on
fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  after  relatively  large  devaluations.  This
choice  imposes  clear  constraints  on  monetary  policy  to  maintain  the
exchange  rate,  as  further  devaluation  would  severely  undermine  the
program's  credibility.  It  also  presumes  sufficient  foreign  reserves,  or  a
sufficiently  devalued  currency,  to  maintain  the  credibility  of the  nominal
peg.  For  Poland,  a  major  rescheduling  of  international  debt  made  it
possible  to  adopt  this  approach:.  Other  CEE  countries,  Moldova  and  the
Kyrgyz  Republic  chose  money  as  the  main  nominal  anchor  for  their
stabilization  programs.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  expectation  that
without  rapid  economic  liberalization  and  fiscal  adjustment,  maintaining
a  fixed  exchange  rate  would  have  been  hard  if not  impossible.
After  their  independence  from  the  FSU,  all  three  Baltic  countries
moved  to  a  monetary  policy  framework  within  the  context  of  a  fixed
exchange  rate  regime.  Their  experience  is  of  particular  interest  as  they
succeeded  in  stabilizing  more  quickly  than  other  former  soviet  republics,
shifting  decisively  away  from  the  socialist  money  and  credit  framework
(Saavalainen  1995).  Estonia  led  the  way  as  the  first  of the  former  soviet
republics  to  issue  its  own  currency,  the  kroon,  and  in  mid-1992  adopted
a  currency  board-type  arrangement,  where  the  central  bank  is  strictly
prohibited  from  lending  to  government  or  state  enterprises  and  base
money  is  fully  backed  by  foreign  reserves. 4 A  currency  board  is
sometimes  viewed  as  renouncing  monetary  policy  altogether,  but  it  has
the  important  advantage  of insulating  policy  from  vested  interests.
Latvia,  not  having  as  ample  reserves  as  Estonia,  initially  adopted  a
money-based  stabilization  strategy.  After  floating  an  interim  currency,
which  circulated  along  with  the  Russian  ruble,  the  government  issued  a
national  currency,  the  lats,  in  mid-1993.  Without  publicly  committing
itself  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  Latvia  has  de  facto  pegged  its
currency  to  the  SDR  since  early  1994.  Lithuania's  initial  commitment  to
controlling  inflation  was  less  firm  than  in  the  other  two  Baltic  countries,
. See  Bruno  (1993),  Flood  and  Mussa  (1994),  Calvo and  Vegh  (1994)  for  the
issues  involved  in  the  selection  of  the  nominal  anchor.  For  a  review  of
performance  of exchange  rate  vs money  as  the  nominal  anchor  see  Sahay  and
Vegh (1995), Citrin  (1995), and  Bennett  (1994).
4  It  might  be  noted  that  restrictions  on  central  bank  lending  led  Estonia  to
create  a  variety  of  budgetary  funds  that  were  on-lent  through  the  domestic
banking  sector  to  support  agriculture,  housing,  exports,  regional  development,
and  small  and  medium  enterprises.  By mid-1996,  these  funds  accounted  for
10 percent  of the  net  credit  to the private  sector.
5but  the  government  gradually  adopted  a  tough  stabilization  program.
Like  Latvia,  it  introduced  an  interim  currency  in  mid- 1992  and  a
national  currency,  the  litas,  in  mid-1993.  In  April  1994,  Lithuania
adopted  a  currency  board  arrangement,  pegging  its  exchange  rate  to  the
dollar.
The  second  group  of  countries  includes  FYR  Macedonia,  Romania,
and  most  of  the  non-Baltic  FSU  countries  plus  Mongolia.  Their  slow
response  was  partly  the  consequence  of  institutional  arrangements
following  the  break  up  of  the  FSU.5  In  particular,  the  non-Baltic  FSU
countries,  including  Moldova  and  Kyrgyz  Republic,  remained  within  the
ruble  zone  for  a  year  or  more  after  gaining  independence.  Under  the
ruble  zone  arrangement,  all  rubles  were  printed  in  Moscow  and  put  into
circulation  by  the  Russian  Federation.  But  perverse  incentives  came  into
play.  The  new  central  banks  of  the  non-Baltic  FSU  countries,  formerly
branches  of  the  USSR  Gosbank,  were  able  to  issue  non-cash  credits  to
purchase  goods  from  other  ruble  zone  members.  In  the  absence  of  a
central  credit  allocation  body  or  set  of  rules  governing  credit  issue,  the
11  new  central  banks  were  able  to  issue  large  amounts  of  credits  and
pressure  the  Russian  government  to  supply  them  with  cash  as  well  as
non-cash  rubles.
There  were  many  attempts  to  create  an  orderly  mechanism  for
credit  allocation  within  the  ruble  zone,  but  the  objective  proved  to  be
elusive,  and  ultimately  non-workable.  The  lack  of agreement  on  rules  of
operation  and  the  attempt  to  maintain  existing  employment  and  output
provided  strong  incentives  for  countries  to  extract  as  many  resources  as
possible  from  the  center,  the  Russian  Federation.  Indeed,  in  the  early
years  following  the  dissolution  of  the  FSU,  Russia's  financing  of  other
ruble  zone  members  through  credit  and  cash  allocations  together  was
quite  large--an  estimated  11  percent  of  GDP  in  1992  and  7  percent  of
GDP  in  1993  (Dabrowski  1995).  Capturing  these  resources  was  in  fact
the  main  element  of monetary  policy  of most  member  countries  until  the
ruble  zone  collapsed  in  late  1993.6  Traditional  monetary  policy  objectives
were  only  adopted  after  issuing  national  currencies  in  1993  and  1994.
5  Following  the  period  covered  in  this  paper,  FYR Macedonia  embarked  on  a
serious  program  of stabilization  and  structural  reforms,  resulting  in  single  digit
inflation  in  1995.
6.  See  also  Conway  (1995),  Granville  (1995),  and  Aslund  (1995)  for  a
discussion  of the  evolution  of the ruble  zone and  reasons  for its  collapse.
6Why  did  these  countries  not  follow  the  lead  of the  Baltics  and  take
control  of  money  and  credit  after  becoming  independent  states?  Their
reluctance  in  this  regard  can  be  seen  from  several  angles.  First,  their
haste  to  disassociate  themselves  politically  from  Russia  was  not  as
strong  as  it was  for  the  Baltics.  Second,  the  geographic  location  of most
of  these  countries  made  the  alternatives  to  trade  with  Russia  less
promising  than  they  were  for  the  Baltics,  and  participation  in  the  ruble
zone  was  seen  as  a  means  of  maintaining  existing,  extensive  trade
relations.  And  third,  many  of  these  countries  were  slow  reformers,
attempting  to  maintain  employment  and  the  existing  production
arrangements  with  directed  credits  to  unreformed  industrial  and
agricultural  enterprises.  Introducing  a  new  currency  to  aid  in
stabilization  would  have  also  required  a  hard  budget  constraint  on  these
enterprises,  suggesting  that  the  overall  strategy  of  transition  largely
determined  the  evolution  of monetary  policy.
C.  The  Use  of  Monetary  Policy  Instruments  During  the  Transition
Availability  of  Instruments
The  beginning  of  transition  marked  an  end  to  the  passive  role
played  by the  financial  sector  under  socialism.  Authorities  were  forced  to
focus  on  monetary  developments--whether  their  key  policy  objective  was
to  regain  price  stability  or  maintain  employment  and  output.  And  the
interest  in  monetary  developments  was  accompanied  by  a  focus  on
available  instruments  to  affect  these  developments.  Table  3
distinguishes  six  separate  instruments--three  direct  and  three  indirect.
Other  factors  also  affect  monetary  developments,  including  a  country's
foreign  exchange  regime  and  the  size  of  the  fiscal  deficit,  but  the
instruments  shown  here  are  the  major  conventional  instruments  relied
upon.  Directed  credit,  credit  ceilings,  and  interest  rate  controls  are
classified  as  direct  instruments;  reserve  requirements,
refinance/discount  facilities,  and  government  and  central  bank  paper  are
classified  as  indirect  instruments.  The  discussion  here  will  be  confined
to  them.
In  general,  direct  instruments  take  the  form  of  regulations  while
indirect  instruments  work  through  markets.  As  pointed  out  in  Hilbers
(1993)  and  Alexander  et  al  (1995),  direct  instruments  generally  set  limits
on  prices  and/or  quantities  and  are  set  in  motion  by  central  bank
initiative.  Indirect  instruments  are  established  by  the  central  bank  but
rely  on  market  determined  prices  and  quantities.  As  such,  they  are  set
in  motion  by  commercial  bank  initiatives.  This  difference  is  not  always
7as  clear-cut  as  suggested,  however;  for  example,  it  is  not  always  easy  to
distinguish  directed  credit,  defined  to  be  at  central  bank  initiative,  from  a
refinance  window  with  preferential  rates  or  access,  defined  as  a  facility
responding  to  commercial  or  specialized  bank  initiative.
The  use  of direct  instruments  does  not  preclude  the  use  of indirect
instruments,  or  vice  versa,  and  they  are  often  used  in  combination.  But
the  form  of instrument  use  varies.  A distinctive  feature  of Table  3  is  the
definition  of three  stages  of market  orientation  for  each  instrument:  "late
socialism,"  "transitional,"  and  "market-oriented."
Appropriate  use  of  instruments
On  an  a  priori  basis,  it  was  not  clear  what  degree  of  market
orientation  would  be  most  effective.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  a  general
consensus  among  economists  that  indirect  instruments  are  more
effective  than  direct  instruments  in  monetary  control  and  that  they
promote  more  efficient  financial  intermediation  (Alexander,  Balino,  and
Enoch  1995).  Also,  there  is  a  view  that  direct  instruments  can  be
abused  since  by  definition  they  depend  on  discretionary  power.
Moreover,  direct  instruments  can  be  circumvented  and  hence  rendered
less  effective,  especially  where  countries,  such  as  the  Baltics  and  those  in
CEE,  have  an  open  capital  account.
On  the  other  hand,  while  it  is  desirable  in  principle  to  switch  to
indirect  monetary  control  methods,  several  observers  (Bredenkamp  1993,
Mathieson  and  Haas  1994,  and  Hilbers  1993)  point  out  that  prevailing
conditions  in  transition  economies  may  not  warrant  their  rapid  adoption
and  use.  Noting  that  the  effectiveness  of  indirect  instruments  depends
on  the  quality  and  nature  of transmission  channels_and  noting  the  close
links  between  financial  sector  reforms,  banking  reorganization  (e.g.
privatization,  new  entry  mergers),  establishment  of  an  effective  legal
framework,  monetary  policy  framework,  capital  markets,  and  other
structural  reform  policies_these  researchers  raise  two  fundamental
problems  that  can  be  expected  to  reduce  the  effectiveness,  and  hence
discourage  the  use,  of  more  market-oriented  instruments  during  the
transition.
The  first  problem  is  the  large  share  of  non-performing  loans  in  the
portfolios  of  many  banks  at  the  beginning  of  the  reform  process.  With
the  administrative  allocation  of  resources  and  soft  budget  constraints
8characteristic  of  the  socialist  economy,  enterprises  were  allowed  to
service  their  loans  through  fresh  borrowing  or  debt-rollover  without  any
tests  of their  economic  viability.  The  collapse  of trade  arrangements  and
sharp  changes  in  relative  prices  accompanying  transition  adversely
affected  the  profitability  of many  enterprises,  undermining  their  ability  to
service  their  loans.
Thorne  (1993)  estimated  that  at  the  end  of  1991  non-performing
loans  were  37  percent  of  total  bank  lending  in  Romania  and  50  percent
in  Hungary  (see  also  Dittus  1994).  More  recently,  the  World  Bank  has
estimated  that  almost  80  percent  of  the  financial  sector  portfolio  in  the
Kyrgyz  Republic  was  non-performing.  The  main  reason  was  the
structural  demand  shift  and  relative  price  changes  which  made
enterprises  unprofitable  and  hence  unable  to  service  previously
contracted  debts.  The  policy  response  of the  authorities,  particularly  in
the  FSU,  did  not  help  to  improve  things.  Most  FSU  governments
continued  with  directed  credit  policies  and  in  effect  ordered  banks  to
lend  to  unprofitable  enterprises.  As  a  result,  the  banks_already
technically  insolvent  given  their  non-performing  assets_became
dysfunctional.
As  many  transition  countries  lacked  an  adequate  prudential
regulation  framework,  this  led  to  the  second,  related,  moral  hazard
problem,  with  insolvent  banks  continuing  to  operate  and  obtaining  more
funds_from  the  central  bank  by  persuasion  and  from  the  public  by
raising  interest  rates.  Under  such  circumstances,  interest  rates  do  not
serve  their  allocation  role;  and,  since  indirect  monetary  control  methods
assume  that  interest  rates  allocate  funds  efficiently,  a  rapid  substitution
of indirect  instruments  could  aggravate  an  already  difficult  situation.  In
fact,  as  a  result  of this  situation  in  some  countries,  Kyrgyz  Republic  for
example,  the  central  bank  screened  commercial  banks  for  solvency
before  they  were  permitted  to  participate  in  central  bank  auctions.
These  circumstances  suggest  that  abolishing  direct  instruments
quickly  could  be  premature  and  also  that  there  is  a  sequencing  issue  for
monetary  reform,  requiring  prior  and  parallel  reforms  in  the  banking  and
enterprise  sectors.  Thus,  the  introduction  of  indirect  instruments  needs
to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  broader  financial  and  enterprise  sector
reforms. 7
. See  Alexander  et al (1995) for further  discussion  of the  benefits  and  costs  of
using  direct  and  indirect  instruments.
9Experience  with  direct  and  indirect  policy  instruments  elsewhere
offers  some  guidance  on  the  pace  of  adoption  and  use  in  transition
economies.  As  recently  reviewed  by  Farahbaksh  and  Sensenbrenner
(1996),  direct  instruments,  especially  credit  ceilings,  were  used  in  a
number  of OECD  countries  during  the  1960s,  1970s  and  1980s.  France,
for  example,  maintained  credit  ceilings  for  almost  20  years,  until  1987.
However,  the  general  trend  in  OECD  countries  has  been  toward  reliance
on  indirect  instruments.  Many  developing  countries  have  also  moved
toward  more  indirect  instruments;  however,  credit  ceilings  are  still
regarded  as  useful  in  other  countries  for  several  reasons.  One  is  the  ease
of  implementation  and  the  perception  that  ceilings  facilitate  the
achievement  of monetary  and  credit  targets.  Another  is  that  ceilings  can
be  coordinated  with  directed  credit  to  priority  sectors--a  common
practice  in  developing  countries.  And  finally,  the  relatively  limited
technical  capabilities  of  the  monetary  authorities  in  many  developing
countries  have  inhibited  the  adoption  of more  indirect  instruments.
Use  of  Instruments  During  Transition
The  analysis  here  was  carried  out  in  two  steps.  First,  we  prepared
26  country  data  sheets,  which  indicate  the  use  of instruments  according
to  the  schema  in  Table  3;  these  are  included  in  Annex  1.  Then  we
classified  each  instrument  in  each  country  in  each  year  as  market-
oriented  or not,  according  to  the  following  criteria:
For  direct  instruments:  Market-orientation  is  defined  by  low
reliance  on  the  three  direct  instruments  in  Table  3 as  indicated  by:
(a) central  bank  directed  credit  less  than  25  percent  of total  credit;
(b) an  absence  of bank-by-bank  credit  ceilings  (some  of which  may
have  been  replaced  by  an  overall  ceiling  on  central  bank  net
domestic  assets);  and  (c) an  absence  of restrictions  on  deposit  and
loan  rates. 8
For  indirect  instruments:  Market-orientation  is  defined  by  the
introduction  and  use  of  market-oriented  forms  of  indirect
instruments,  namely:  (a)  maximum  reserve  requirements  equal  to
12  percent  or  less;  (b)  a  refinance  window  with  auction  or  non-
preferential  rates  and/or  rediscount/lombard  facilities;  and  (c)
These  criteria  are  suggested  by Alexander  et al (1995).
10government  or  central  bank  paper  used  for  monetary  operations  or
actively  traded  in  a  secondary  market.
Table  4a  summarizes  the  findings,  which  are  used  to  create  an  index  of
market  orientation  for  each  instrument,  an  overall  index  of  MOMPI
(Market  Orientation  of  Monetary  Policy  Instruments),  and  dummy
variables  for  use  in  the  regression  analysis  in  Section  E.
During  the  early  phase  of  transition,  all  countries  seem  to  have
used  at  least  one  and  often  all  three  direct  instruments  in  the
implementation  of their  monetary  policies.  Moreover,  by  late  1994,  most
countries  still  had  maximum  ratios  above  12  percent--the  somewhat
arbitrary  level  designated  above  as  the  cut-off  between  the  direct  versus
indirect  use  of  this  instrument.  And  some  countries  had  retained
interest  rate  controls  and  had  not  yet  developed  a  market  for  government
paper.  Other  countries,  however,  had  a  high  or  substantial  market
orientation.  On  average,  CEE  countries  and  "fast  response"  countries
switched  more  quickly  from  direct  to  indirect  instruments,  but  variation
within  these  groups  can  also  be  observed.  A brief  description  of the  use
of instruments  during  transition  follows:
Directed  credit.  As  late  as  1990,  all  countries  except  Hungary  and
Poland  had  large  directed  credit  programs  inherited  from  the  central  plan
period.  These  programs,  financed  by  central  bank  credit  channeled
through  commercial  banks  at  preferential  interest  rates,  were  used  to
support  enterprises  in  designated  sectors,  usually  including  agriculture.
About  half  the  countries  sharply  reduced  the  share  of directed  credit  with
the  beginning  of  reform,  and  by  1995  the  share  of directed  credit  in  total
credit  had  fallen  to  under  25  percent  in  many  countries,  although  it
remained  high  in  "slow  response"  countries.  In  these  latter  countries,
directed  credits  were  retained  and  channeled  to  state  enterprises  at
subsidized  rates,  leading  to  large  quasi-fiscal  deficits  and  high  inflation
(see  de  Melo  et.  al  1996).
Credit  ceilings.  Credit  ceilings  were  used  in  several  CEE  countries
in  the  early  1990s,  but  the  effectiveness  of implementation  varied.  In  the
Czech  Republic,  for  example,  ceilings  on  commercial  bank  credits  were
enforced  strictly  by  the  authorities.  In  Bulgaria,  ceilings  were  exceeded
in  1992,  and  it was  only  in  1994  that  monetary  aggregates  were  brought
under  control  and  credit  ceilings  removed.  Most  "slow  response"
countries  did  not  use  credit  ceilings;  limitations  on  credit  expansion
would  have  been  inconsistent  with  the  authorities'  strategy  of  using
directed  credit  to  maintain  employment  and  output  in  state  enterprises.
11Interest  controls.  Interest  rates  on  bank  deposits  and  loans  have
been  market  determined  since  late  1992/early  1993  in  most  "fast
response"  countries.  The  removal  of interest  rate  controls,  however,  has
involved  some  difficulties  and  has  not  always  led  to  positive,  moderate
real  rates,  as  expected.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  cases,  such  as
Romania,  where  interest  rates  were  liberalized  during  the  early  days  of
transition  but,  as  a  result  of  collusion  among  banks,  did  not  become
positive  before  late  1994.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  countries,  for
example  Slovenia  and  Macedonia,  where  real  interest  rates  were  quite
high.  Moreover,  many  countries  in  the  FSU,  as  well  as  Albania,  have
removed  interest  rate  controls  more  gradually  than  those  in  CEE,  even
allowing  for  a  two  year  difference  in  the  start  of  reforms.  About  half
these  countries  have  relied  on  minimum  and  maximum  interest  rates,  as
well  as  controls  on  margins.  The  others  have  maintained  direct  controls
on  nominal  deposit  and  loan  rates  and,  except  in  Albania,  the  resulting
real  rates  have  been  highly  negative  over  the  last  couple  of  years,
contributing  strongly  to  disintermediation  and  undermining  attempts  at
stabilization.
Reserve  requirements.  Reserve  requirements  were  put  in  effect  by
all  countries  soon  after  the  beginning  of  reforms.  Enforcement  lagged
especially  in  the  non-Baltic  FSU,  but  by  1995  most  central  banks  were
able  to  enforce  them  relatively  effectively.  Ratios  were  high  initially,
presumably  due  to  high  inflation  and  the  desire  of authorities  to  absorb
liquidity.  In  the  non-Baltic  FSU,  reserve  ratios  were  frequently  changed,
with  a  tendency  to  raise  the  level  to  absorb  liquidity,  contributing  to  the
disintermediation  trend  discussed  earlier.  Many  CEE  countries  lowered
reserve  ratios  over  time,  although  in  Croatia  they  rose  to  34  percent  in
mid-1995.
Refinance  window.  Most  countries  also  introduced  a  refinance
window,  but  its  use  differed.  Countries  in  CEE  were  more  likely  to  use
this  instrument  in  a  market-oriented  and  non-interventionist  fashion
without  preferential  access.  The  refinancing  rate  was  set  at  the  central
bank  discount  rate  or  established  on  the  basis  of  auctions.  In  some
countries,  there  remained  small  amounts  of refinancing  for  agriculture  or
housing.  Rediscount  and  Lombard  facilities  were  put  in  place,  and  their
importance  seems  to  have  increased  over  time.  By  1995  commercial
bank  borrowing  from  the  central  bank  was  mostly  carried  out  through
the  use  of this  instrument.  In  many  FSU  countries,  refinancing  facilities
were  often  used  to  direct  credit  for  specific  purposes  at  preferential  rates.
The  rediscount  and  Lombard  facilities  are  not  as  extensively  used.
12Market  for  government  paper.  Government,  and  in  some  countries
central  bank,  paper  was  introduced  relatively  early  in  CEE  countries.9  In
Hungary,  this  instrument  existed  since  1988  and  by  1993  monetary
policy  was  being  implemented  mostly  through  open-market-type
operations,  using  government  paper.  While  some  other  countries  have
introduced  secondary  market  trade,  it  is  limited  and  government  paper
typically  is  not  used  for  open-market-type  operations.  In  the  non-Baltic
FSU,  this  instrument  may  have  been  introduced  but  is  typically  not  yet
developed.
By late  1994,  there  was  substantial  diversity  in  the  extent  to  which
transition  countries  were  relying  on  market-oriented  instruments  of
monetary  policy.  We can  distinguish  four  groups  on  the  basis  of the  data
in  Table  4a,  which  classify  the  market-oriented  use  of  six  different
instruments:
9. For issues  involved  in  the  use  of government  versus  central  bank  paper  see
Quintyn  (1994).
13Table  4a.  Market  Orientation  of  Monetary  Instruments  at end-1994
High  Substantial  Moderate  Low
Bulgaria  Croatia  Albania  *Armenia
Czech  Rep.  Lithuania  *Azerbaijan  *Belarus
Estonia  *FYR  *Georgia  Kyrgyz  Rep.
Macedonia
Hungary  *Kazakstan  Moldova
Latvia  *Mongolia  *Turkmenistan




High:  5 or  6 instruments
Substantial:  4 instruments
Moderate:  3  instruments
Low:  1 or  2 instruments
*  Countries  stabilizing  relatively  slowly  (see  Table  2).
As  of  end-1994,  countries  with  "high"  market  orientation  met  all,
or  almost  all,  the  criteria  of  market  orientation  specified  above.  To  the
extent  that  these  countries  still  relied  on  direct  instruments,  they  used
market-oriented  forms;  also,  they  have  all  introduced  the  main  indirect
instruments  used  in  market  economies.  The  speed  of  introduction
differed,  reflecting  the  pace  of  broader  structural  reforms,  including
solving  the  non-performing  loan  problem.  For  example,  the  Czech
Republic  eliminated  almost  all  direct  controls  in  1992,  whereas  Bulgaria
phased  them  out  in  1994.
Countries  with  "substantial"  market  orientation  use  both  direct
and  indirect  instruments  for  policy  making  purposes;  in  some  countries,
there  have  been  policy  reversals.  Implementation  difficulties  are
common,  often  as  a  result  of  lack  of  parallel  financial  sector  reforms.
Countries  with  "moderate"  or  "low" market  orientation  continue  to  rely  on
14either  directed  credit  or  interest  rate  controls,  or  both,  to  influence
money  and  credit.  They  typically  have  high  reserve  requirements  and
have  not  developed  secondary  markets  for  government  or  central  bank
paper.  However,  most  have  introduced  a  refinancing  facility  based  on
auction  or  non-preferential  interest  rates.
Figure  1 shows  the  average  differences  in  CEE  and  FSU  countries
from  1990  through  1994,  at  which  time  the  CEE  countries  had  switched
almost  entirely  to  market-oriented  instruments  while  FSU  were  clearly
relying  on  a  combination  of  both  market  and  non-market  instruments.
The  decline  in  market-orientation  of  FSU  countries  after  1991  was
primarily  due  to  the  increase  in  reserve  ratios,  designed  to  absorb
liquidity  in  a  highly  inflationary  environment.
Instrument  Use around  Stabilization
One  difficulty  in  cross-country  comparisons  of  transition
economies  is that  reforms  were  initiated  at  different  points  in  time.  In  an
attempt  to  control  for  the  timing  of  reform,  we  look  here  at  how
instruments  were  used  at  the  time  of  stabilization.  Figure  2  shows  the
sequencing  of  market-oriented  use  of  monetary  instruments  during  the
year  of  stabilization  (year  T,  as  shown  in  Table  2)  and  also  during  the
years  before  (year  T-1)  and  after  (year  T+1).  With  the  exception  of  credit
ceilings,  which  were  reimposed  by  several  CEE  countries  during  the  year
of  stabilization,  countries  on  average  shifted  progressively  toward
market-oriented  instruments.  As  indicated  above,  FSU  tended  to  raise
reserve  requirements  as  inflation  persisted,  but  CEE  countries  typically
reduced  reserve  ratios  and  switched  from  directed  credit  programs  to  a
more  market  oriented  refinance  window.
Tables  4b  and  4c  organize  the  data  in  Table  4a  to  show  the  market
orientation  of instrument  use  in  CEE  and  FSU  countries  around  the  time
of  stabilization  (year  T).  The  "grand  total"  for  each  country  is  used  to
define  an  annual  country  index  for  the  Market  Orientation  of  Monetary
Policy  Instruments  (MOMPI),  used  in  some  simple  correlations  reported
below.  The  average  "scores"  on  market  orientation  permit  a  comparison
between  CEE  and  FSU  countries  at  any  point  in  time.  It  indicates,  for
example  that  FSU  countries  were  actually  slightly  more  market  oriented
than  CEE  countries  in  the  year  before  stabilization,  perhaps  because
stabilization  occurred  somewhat  later  relative  to  the  beginning  of
transition;  however,  they  moved  more  slowly  toward  market  orientation
during  and  following  stabilization.
15Table  4d  shows  the  average  market  orientation  for  specific
instruments  in  index  form  around  the  time  of  stabilization.  The  indices
for  "all  countries"  show  that  almost  all  countries  had  contained  directed
credit  and  replaced  it  with  a  market-oriented  refinance  window,  and
most  countries  had  removed  interest  rate  controls,  by  the  year  following
stabilization.  The  use  of credit  ceilings  shows  as  different  pattern,  in  that
countries  increased  their  reliance  on  credit  ceilings  during  stabilization.
This  was  particularly  true  in  CEE  and  "fast  response"  countries.  Indices
for  country  groups  also  point  up  the  much  slower  movement  in  FSU  and
Mongolia  on  the  removal  of  interest  rate  controls,  the  adoption  of  more
moderate  reserve  ratios,  and  the  development  of markets  for  government
paper.  These  differences  exist,  but  to  a  lesser  degree  between  "fast-
response"  and  "slow-response"  countries.
The  relationship  between  the  adoption  of  market-oriented
instruments  and  the  choice  of  a  nominal  anchor  in  a  country's
stabilization  program  is  shown  in  Table  4e.  In  general,  countries  relying
on  an  exchange  rate  anchor,  either  initially  or  following  an  initial  reliance
on  a  monetary  target  moved  quickly  toward  more  market-oriented
monetary  policy  instruments,  while  countries  relying  exclusively  on  a
money  anchor  did  not.  In  particular,  all  countries  using  an  exchange
rate  anchor  contained  the  amount  of directed  credit  and  removed  interest
rate  controls.
D.  Monetary  Policy  Stance  and  Effectiveness
Here  we  define  some  indicators  of  monetary  policy  stance  and
effectiveness,  in  order  to  relate  them  to  the  introduction  of  market
oriented  instruments.  No  attempt  is  made  to  define  policy  stance  in
relative  terms_for  example,  relative  to  the  current  rate  of inflation  or  to
changes  in  the  demand  for  money-although  this  would  be  an  important
consideration  in  the  formulation  of  monetary  targets.  Rather,  several
simple  nominal  indicators  of  average  policy  stance  are  considered,  and
base  money  growth  is  chosen  as  the  most  appropriate  indicator  for
purposes  of  classification.  Inflation  and  financial  depth  are  used  as
indicators  of policy  effectiveness.
Policy  Stance
Four  simple  indicators  of  monetary  policy  stance  are  provided  in
Table  5:  the  average  growth  rate  of base  money,  which  reflects  the  use  of
directed  credit  and  refinance  facilities  as  well  as  central  bank  financing
of  the  fiscal  deficit;  the  average  growth  of  broad  money,  which  is
16influenced  by  reserve  requirements  as  well  as  inflation  and  other  factors;
the  effectiveness  of  credit  ceilings;  and  the  average  real  discount  rate  in
1992-94.  The  average  growth  of base  money  is  used  as  the  classification
criterion  to  organize  countries  in  to  three  groups:
Group  1:  moderate
Group 2:  loose
Group  3:  very  loose
It  is  clear  from  the  group  averages  that  other  indicators  of  policy  stance
are  consistent  with  this  one.
On  the  one  hand,  given  the  void  in  enterprise  governance,
especially  in  the  early  stages  of  transition,  tight  monetary  policy  forces
reallocation  of  resources  toward  more  productive  uses,  thus  generating
growth.  On  the  other  hand,  as  argued  by  Portes  1993  and  Calvo  and
Coricelli  1993,  monetary  policy  can  be  too  tight,  restricting  growth.  On
balance,  however,  the  most  recent  literature  suggests  output  recovery
has  occurred  in  countries  that  had  relatively  tight  monetary  policies
(Citrin  et.  al.  1995  and  Sahay  and  Vegh  1995),  possibly  because  nowhere
was  average  annual  base  money  growth  less  than  20  percent.
Effectiveness
We  can  identify  three  plausible  objectives  of monetary  policy:  price
stability;  financial  depth,  as  a  determinant  of  economic  growth,  and
growth  itself.  Table  6  provides  data  for  1990-94  on  all  three  objectives-
-lower  inflation,  greater  financial  depth,  and  higher  real  growth  in  GDP.
Countries  are  grouped,  as  above,  by  policy  stance,  and  it  can  be  seen
that  achievement  of these  objectives  is  associated  with  a  moderate  policy
stance  (Group  1),  suggesting  that  it  may  have  been  relatively  tight  but
was  not  too  tight.
In  the  econometric  analysis  which  follows,  we  take  only  price
stability  and  financial  depth  as  measures  of effectiveness.  Price  stability
is  the  traditional  objective  of  monetary  policy,  and  the  relationship
between  financial  depth  and  growth  is  explained  in  the  remainder  of this
section.  Growth  itself  is  not  used  as  a  measure  effectiveness  here,  as  too
many  other  factors  affect  it  to  try  to  separate  out  the  effect  of  market-
oriented  monetary  instruments.
The  importance  of financial  depth  in  development  was  stressed  by
Mckinnon  and  Shaw  in  the  early  1970s.  Subsequent  cross-country
comparisons  have  largely  confirmed  this  relationship  (see  King  and
Levine  1993,  Fry  1995).  The  basic  idea  is  that  the  level  of  financial
17intermediation  is  a  proxy  for  the  level  and  quality  of  financial  services,
including  entrepreneurial  selection,  and  that  effective  financial  services
promote  growth  through  both  capital  accumulation  and  improvements  in
economic  efficiency.
Transition  from  a  command  economy  to  a  market  economy  has,
however,  been  accompanied  by  a  collapse  in  financial  ratios  in  many
countries.  Table  7 compares  the  average  annual  ratios  of domestic  broad
money  to  GDP  in  transition  economies  to  those  in  other  countries
classified  by  income  level.  As  shown,  this  ratio  is  higher  for  high  income
countries,  and  in  recent  years  financial  depth  has  increased  in  high-
income  countries.  In  1989,  at  the  beginning  of transition,  CEE  and  FSU
countries  also  had  relatively  high  financial  ratios  on  average.  But  by
1993/94  financial  ratios  had  declined  and,  in  CEE  countries,  were
comparable  to  those  in  lower-middle  income  countries.  Ratios  in  all
FSU  countries  and  Mongolia  fell  dramatically  and  by  1993/94  had
dropped  well  below  those  in  low-income  countries.  These  trends  can  be
compared  to  the  experience  of  transition  countries  in  East  Asia,  namely
China  and  Vietnam,  where  financial  depth  has  increased.
There  are  a  number  of  factors  that  might  cause  disintermediation
and  account  for  the  large  differences  observed  in  CEE  and  FSU
countries.  One  factor  is  the  elimination  of the  monetary  overhang,  which
appears  to  have  been  larger  in  the  FSU  (see  de  Melo  et  al.  1996).
Declines  in  financial  ratios  in  some  countries,  however,  exceed  rough
estimates  of  the  monetary  overhang  as  a  percent  of  GDP.  Other  factors
are  inflation  and  highly  negative  ex  ante  and  ex  post  real  interest  rates,
especially  in  FSU  countries;  these  have  resulted  in  an  erosion  of financial
savings  and  little  incentive  to  hold  domestic  currency  in  any  form.  Yet
another  factor  appears  to  be  informal  credit  in  the  form  of  inter-
enterprise  arrears  (see  Citrin  et  al.  1995).  Such  credit  may  substitute  for
M 1  and  thus  help  to  explain  the  observed  high  velocity  in  certain
transition  economies.  Also,  credibility  of  reforms  and  hysteresis  effects
may  account  for  continuing  high  levels  of  currency  substitution;  foreign
currency  deposits  remain  high  relative  to  M2  in  Poland  and  the  Czech
Republic,  for  example,  despite  stabilization  and  growth  (Calvo  and  Sahay
1995).
In  Section  E  below,  we  investigate  the  extent  to  which  financial
depth  may  be  affected  by  the  market-oriented  use  of  monetary
instruments.  The  focus  is  on  domestic  liquid  liabilities,  as  they  allow  the
government  to  generate  investible  resources  in  the  form  of  seignorage.
The  evolution  of  this  ratio  in  relationship  to  policy  stance  is  shown  in
18Table  6,  and  Figure  3  shows  that  a  similar  pattern  exists  for  the
evolution  of  total  broad  money  (including  foreign  exchange
deposits)  / GDP.
E.  Effectiveness,  Stance  and  Instrument  Use
Association  of  Effectiveness,  Stance,  and  Instrument  Use  during
stabilization
Table  8  integrates  the  three  dimensions  of  monetary  policy
developed  above:  market-orientation  of  instrument  use,  policy  stance,
and  effectiveness.  Classifications  are  based  on  criteria  used  earlier  and
applied  to  the  year  of stabilization  and  the  year  after  (see  notes  to  Table  8
for further  explanation).  Three  broad  observations  can  be  made.
First,  neither  policy  stance  nor  effectiveness  depends  on  the
market-orientation  of instruments.  Albania  has  implemented  a  relatively
tight  monetary  policy  with  low  market  orientation,  and  Mongolia  has
implemented  in  program  that  proved  effective  with  low  market
orientation.  (Estonia  is  somewhat  of a  special  case,  where  the  adherence
to  a  currency  board,  which  may  be  the  ultimate  market-oriented
instrument,  pre-empts  the  use  of  more  traditional  market-oriented
instruments.)
Second,  Table  8  suggests  an  association  between  market-
orientation  of  instruments,  moderate  policy  stance,  and  effectiveness  in
the  CEE  countries  and  lack  of  market  orientation,  loose  policy  stance,
and  ineffectiveness  in  the  FSU  countries.  This  association  is  due  to  a
variety  of  factors  including  differences  in  initial  conditions  and  in  the
pace  of  liberalization.  CEE  countries  liberalized  earlier  and  to  a  greater
extent,  although  the  Baltics  were  not  far  behind.  Initial  macroeconomic
distortions  and  dependence  on  socialist  trade  were  lower  in  CEE
countries,  and  more  favorable  experience  with  inflation  and  output  loss
there  may  have  made  it  easier  to  conduct  a  more  moderate  monetary
policy.  For  the  non-Baltic  FSU,  adherence  to  the  ruble  zone_a  policy
which  appeared  initially  to  have  some  merit  but  subsequently  to  delay
reform_bound  these  countries  together  in  a  roller-coaster  ride  into
hyperinflation  and  large  declines  in  real  output,  both  of  which  lowered
dramatically  the  transactions  demand  for money.
And  third,  it  seems  clear  that  the  FSU  countries  showing  the
lowest  market-orientation  and  the  loosest  monetary  policy  continue  to
rely  on  rationing  through  directed  credit  and  interest  controls  because
19direct  controls  serve  their  purpose,  to  provide  support  to  state
enterprises  despite  their  failure  to  restructure.  The  need  for  further
institutional  development  is  no  doubt  a  limitation,  but  other  FSU
countries  with  similar  underdeveloped  institutions  have  made  faster
strides.  Russia  and  the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  for  example,  have  introduced
screening  criteria  to  distinguish  better  managed,  more  solvent  banks  so
that  market-oriented  policy  instruments  can  be  introduced  on  a  limited
basis  in  a  more  stable  environment.  In  reality,  it  seems  that  it  is  not  so
much  underdeveloped  institutions  that  limit  policy  effectiveness  but  the
policy  goal,  which  limits  the  shift  to  the  full  range  of  market  oriented
monetary  instruments.
Simple  correlations  between  base  money  growth,  inflation,  and  the
MOMPI  index  around  the  time  of  stabilization  are  given  in  Table  9.  As
expected,  the  correlation  between  base  money  growth  and  inflation  is
positive  and  high,  although  less  high  during  stabilization  in  the  FSU  and
"fast  response"  countries.  This  suggests  that  the  problems  of  stabilizing
quickly  in  the  Baltics,  Moldova,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Mongolia  were
more  complex  than  in  CEE  countries.  There  is  a  strong  negative
correlation  between  base  money  growth  and  the  use  of  market-oriented
instruments  in  "slow-response"  countries  the  year  before  stabilization,
suggesting  that  the  most  rapid  money  growth  took  the  form  of  highly
subsidized  directed  credit.  This  interpretation  is  consistent  with  other
evidence  that  stabilization  was  undertaken  at  varying  stages  of  reform.
Using  the  cumulative  liberalization  index  (CLI)  developed  in  de  Melo,
Denizer  and  Gelb  1996,  most  countries  were  at  an  intermediary  stage,
between  .5  and  .8  on  a  scale  of  0  to  1.  However,  Mongolia  and  several
FSU  countries--namely,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,
Kazakstan,  Tajikistan,  and  Uzbekistan--stabilized  with  a  CLI  between  .35
and  .45,  indicating  less  reform;  and  Ukraine  attempted  stabilization  in
late  1994  with  a  CLI of only  .26.
Inflation  and  the  MOMPI  index  were  positively  and  relatively
strongly  correlated  in  CEE  countries  the  year  before  stabilization.  But
this  is  not  necessarily  evidence  that  the  move  toward  market-orientation
was  premature;  rather,  it  probably  reflects  the  fact  that  a  switch  to
market-oriented  monetary  instruments  coincided  with  price  liberalization
in  these  countries.  These  same  two  indicators  were  negatively  correlated
in  "slow  response"  countries  the  year  prior  to  stabilization,  suggesting
that  price  liberalization  had  already  taken  place  and  that  a  switch  to
market  oriented  instruments  may  have  coincided  with  real  structural
reforms  implemented  prior  to  stabilization.  In  the  year  after
stabilization,  market  orientation  was  negatively  associated  with  both
20base  money  growth  and  inflation  for  all  country  groups,  suggesting  that
they  were  more  effective  than  not.
Effectiveness  and  market-oriented  use  of instruments
Next,  using  regression  analysis,  we  explore  to  what  extent  the
market-oriented  use  of  instruments  may  have  promoted  or  deterred
effectiveness.  Policy  stance  is  taken  into  account  by  using  the  real
discount  rate  in  the  equations  for  financial  depth  (measured  by  M2/GDP)
and  the  growth  of  base  money  in  the  equations  for  price  stability
(measured  by  the  annual  CPI).  The  time  span  of data  for  the  regressions,
shown  in  Table  10,  is  typically  1990-94  for  CEE  (except  the  Former
Yugoslav  Republics)  and  Mongolia  and  1991-94  for  other  countries.
Three  equations  are  estimated  for  each  dependent  variable.  In  the
first  equation,  we  include  all  the  instruments;  in  the  second  equation,  we
include  only  those  instruments  that  are  statistically  significant.  And  in
the  third  equation  we  substitute  the  composite  MOMPI  index  for
individual  instrument  dummy  variables.  In  each  equation,  we  specify  a
lagged  independent  variable,  a  policy  variable,  and  two  conditioning
variables--one  representing  a  time  trend  and  one  representing  price
liberalization.  The  lagged  variable  accounts  for  the  influence  of  omitted
variables  which  have  a  continuing,  or  persistent,  effect  over  the  period
covered.  The  time  trend  variable  is  added  to  account  for  time  variant
factors.  The  price  liberalization  variable  is  defined  as  the  change  in  the
index  of domestic  price  liberalization_-one  of the  three  components  of the
liberalization  index  developed  in  de  Melo  et  al.  1996.  Where  indicated,
we  used  the  fixed  effects  estimation  method  to  allow  for  country-specific
effects  on  the  dependent  variable.
Table  11  presents  the  equations  for  financial  depth,  which  use  the
fixed  effects  method.  Persistence  explains  about  a  third  of  financial
depth,  much  of  the  remainder  appears  to  be  explained  by  the  policy
stance  variable  and  a  negative  time  trend.  The  relationship  between
financial  depth  and  the  MOMPI  index  is  positive,  but  not  statistically
significant;  however,  there  is  a  significant  positive  association  between
financial  depth  and  the  market  orientation  of  two  specific  instruments--
the  elimination  of  credit  ceilings  (CC) and  development  of the  market  for
government  paper  (TCB).  As  indicated  in  Tables  4b  and  4c,  many
countries  imposed  credit  controls  at  the  time  of  stabilization,  since  other
regulatory  systems  were  weak  or  ineffective.  However,  successful
stabilizers  removed  credit  controls  rather  quickly,  providing  a  strong
signal  that  economic  conditions  had  returned  to  normal.  This  signal
21coincided  with,  and  may  have  contributed  to,  an  increase  in  demand  for
broad  money.  A significant  and  positive  link  between  financial  depth  and
TCB  could  be  viewed  as  the  normal  and  expected  outcome,  since
development  of  this  market  is  facilitated  by  normalization  of  economic
conditions.
Table  12  presents  the  equations  for  inflation.  Here,  the  lagged
variable  explains  closer  to  half  current  inflation,  with  much  of  the
remainder  explained  by  money  growth,  a  smaller  negative  time  trend
than  in  the  previous  equations,  and  price  liberalization.  The  relationship
between  base  money  growth  and  inflation  confirms  that  policy  stance
operates  in  the  expected  way  to  attain  price  stability  during  the
transition  process  and  countries  that  were  able  to  restrict  base  money
growth  were  able  to  control  inflation.  This,  of course,  does  not  mean  that
there  were  not  other  factors  influencing  inflation.  As  shown  by  Citrin  et
al.  1995,  for  example,  increases  in  energy  prices  and  other  shocks
affected  inflation  in  the  short  term.  And  the  PLIB  variable  here  indicates
that,  given  the  large  money  overhang  and  negative  real  interest  rates  in
many  transition  economies,  the  elimination  of price  controls  led  to  higher
price  levels  and  the  erosion  of real  money  balances.
Turning  to  the  use  of market-oriented  instruments,  the  elimination
of  directed  credit  and  the  introduction  of  a  market-oriented  refinancing
window  are  both  negatively  and  significantly  associated  with  inflation.
Most  other  instruments  are  negatively  related  to  inflation  but  are  not
significant.  However,  equation  3  shows  that  the  inclusion  of the  overall
MOMPI  index  results  in  a fall  in  the  significance  of the  price  liberalization
variable.  The  significant,  negative  association  between  the  MOMPI  index
and  inflation  suggests  that--even  if the  association  is  explained  largely  by
the  fact  that  countries  with  lower  inflation  found  it  easier  to  introduce
market-oriented  instruments--on  the  whole  the  introduction  of  market-
oriented  instruments  did  not  aggravate  the  problem  of inflation  control.
F.  Conclusions
In  this  paper  we  looked  at  monetary  policy  in  26  transition
economies  in  CEE  and  FSU  between  1989-1994.  We provided  a  schema
for  classifying  the  use  of  six  important  monetary  policy  instruments,
both  direct  and  indirect,  and  suggested  criteria  for  defining  market-
oriented  use  of these  instruments.  We then  made  an  assessment  of  the
extent  of market-oriented  instrument  use  during  the  period  under  review
and  around  stabilization.  The  impact  of instrument  use  on  inflation  and
22financial  depth,  which  declined  dramatically  during  the  early  years  of
transition,  is  also  explored.
Our  conclusions  indicate  several  clear  patterns.  First,  by  end-
1994,  slightly  less  than  half  the  countries  were  relying  primarily  on
market-oriented  forms  of  monetary  instruments,  and  slightly  more  than
half  had  moderate  or  low  reliance  on  such  instruments.  As  might  be
expected,  countries  that  quickly  formulated  a  monetary  policy  response
following  the  break  from  socialist  central  planning  were  more  likely  to
switch  to  market-oriented  instruments.  Second,  CEE  countries  moved
more  rapidly  than  FSU  countries  toward  these  forms,  even  when  we
control  for  stage  of  stabilization.  Third,  the  use  of  credit  ceilings  was
seen  to  be  helpful  in  the  year  of  stabilization,  especially  in  CEE
countries.  And  the  elimination  of  credit  controls  was  associated  with
effective  stabilization.
Our  findings  support  the  view  that  policy  stance,  as  measured  by
base  money  growth  and  the  real  discount  rate,  was  effective  in  helping  to
reverse  undesirable  inflation  and  disintermediation  trends.  But  the
relationship  between  effectiveness  and  market  orientation  of  monetary
policy  instruments  is  less  clear.  Financial  depth  is  associated  with  the
elimination  of  credit  ceilings  and  the  development  of  markets  for
government  paper,  and  inflation  is  associated  with  the  elimination  of
directed  credit  and  the  establishment  of  a  market-oriented  refinancing
window.  The  overall  index  of  the  market  orientation  of  monetary  policy
instruments  (MOMPI)  is  negatively  related  to  inflation,  but  the  direction
of causality  is  unclear.
On  balance,  the  relatively  weak  link  between  market  orientation  of
instruments  and  indicators  of  effectiveness  suggests  that  inflation
control  and  financial  depth  are  more  directly  related  to  policy  stance,
which  is  in  turn  related  to  broader  structural  reforms.  As  concluded  by
de  Melo  et.  al  1996  and  Fischer,  Sahay  and  Vegh  (1996),  monetary
stability  goes  hand  in  hand  with  adjustment  in  the  real  sectors.
Subsidies  and  central  bank  support  of  public  enterprises  to  help
maintain  employment  and  output  are  ultimately  financed  by  money
creation,  reducing  the  options  for  monetary  policy  regardless  of  the
market-orientation  of the  monetary  system.
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Pre-Transition  Financial  Ratios  as Percent  of GDPa)
Countries  Year  Currency  DD  TSD  FXD  Total M2
Central  and Eastern  Europe
Albaniac)  1990  9  n.a.  n.a.  0  31
Bulgariac)  1989  14  37  52  4  107
Croatiae)  1991  3  7  5  8  23
Czech  Republicc)  d)  1989  9  30  29  0  68
Hungaryc)  1989  10  9  19  1  38
FYR Macedoniae)  1991  4  11  3  6  24
Polandcl  1989  4  4  4  11  22
Romania  1989  8  17  23  1  51
Slovak  Republicc)  d)  1989  9  30  29  0  68
Sloveniae)  1991  2  5  6  8  21
Group  Average:  7  15  18  4  42
Former  Soviet Union  and Mongolia:
Armenia  1991  n.a.  18  56  0  74
Azerbaijan  1991  37  19  23  n.a.  79
Belarusb)  1991  5  28  17  0  50
Estoniac)  1991  11  25  18  24  66
Georgia  1991  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Kazakstan  1991  13  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  71
Kyrgyz  Republic  1991  13  15  15  n.a  43
Latvia  1991  10  n.a.  n.a.  7  40
Lithuaniac)  1991  14  24  6  2  47
Moldovae)  1991  6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  70
Russia  1991  9  n.a.  n.a.  8  61
Tajikistane)  1991  16  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Turkmenistan  1991  21  40  3  n.a.  64
Ukraine  1991  9  37  21  0  67
Uzbekistan  1991  22  21  21  n.a.  64
Mongolia  1989  5  25  14  1  46
Group  Average:  14  25  20  5  60
Sources:  for the FSU - IMF Economic  Reviews and REDs; for CEE -Central  Bank bulletins and IFS
Notes:
a) Monetary  stocks are averages  of end-year  stocks  from the specified  year and the previous year, except as noted.
b) FXD include an amount  frozen at VEB  in Moscow.
c) Quarterly  averages  of monetary stocks, except  for FXD of Czech  and S1ovak  Republics.
d) Data for the federation
e) Monetary stocks are end-current  year; to account for that, they are deflated  by CPI (eop) and GDP is deflated  by CPI (pa).
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Monetary  Policy  Framework
Principal  Nominal
Adoption  of  Anchor  in  Newly  Introduced
Countries  Stabilization  Program  Stabilization  Program  Currency
Group  1: Fast  Responsea)
Albania  111/92  Money  No
Bulgaria  1/91  Money  No
Croatia  IV/93  First  money,  Yes, 11/94
later  exchange  rate
Czech  Republic  1/91  Exchange  Rate  No
Hungary  1/90  Money  No
Poland  1/90  Exchange  Rate  No
Slovenia  1/92  Money  Yes, 1/92
Slovak Republic  1/91  Exchange  Rate  Yes, 1/93
Estonia  11/92  Exchange  Rate  Yes, 11/92
(currency  board)
Latvia  11/92  First  money,  Yes, 111/93
later  exchange  rate
Lithuania  11/92  First  money,  later  exchange  Yes, 11/93
rate (currency  board)
Kyrgyz  Republic  11/93  Money  Yes, 11/93
Moldova  111/93  Money  Yes, 111/93
Group 2: Slower  Response
FYR  Macedonia  1/94  Money  Yes, 11/94
Romania  IV/93  Money  No
Armenia  IV/94  Money  Yes, IV/93
Azerbaijan  1/95  Money  Yes, 111/93
Belarus  IV/94  Money  Yes, IV/94
Georgia  111/94  Money  Yes, 111/95
Kazakstan  1/94  Money  Yes, IV/93
Russia  11/95  Money  Yes, 111/93
Tajikistan  1/95  Money  Yes, 11/95
Turkmenistan  No targets  as of IV/95  n/a  Yes, IV/93
Ukraine  IV/94  Money  Yes, IV/92
Uzbekistan  IV/94  Money  Yes, 11/94
Mongolia  11/93  Money  No
Source:  Column 1: Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (95); except Mongolia.
Columns 2 and 3: IMF and World Bank reports
a)  Countries adopting a stabilization program within the first two years of transition (see Table 1 for base year).
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Main Instruments  of Monetary Policy in CEE/FSUR'
Use of Instruments  during  Transitionk'
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A. DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1.  Directed credits  enterprises  banks  credit auction
2.  Credit  ceilings  Bank-by-bank  ceilings,  ceiling on CB net domestic
tradable ceilings  assets, or none
3.  Interest  rate controls  fixed administered  max. and min. rates  none
on commercial  bank  rates  or margin fixed
depositilending  rates
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4.  Reserve  requirements  none  high and/or changing  low and stable
levels
5.  Refinance  windows  preferential  refinance at single rate  credit auction
rates/access
and
Rediscount/Lombard  introduction  fully developed
facilities
6.  Gov't and CB bills  and  introduced sometimes  secondary market  open-market type operation
bonds  w/statutory  liquidity  trade introduced  or fully developed
ratios  secondary market trade
CB =  central bank
a.  See  Alexander, Balino, and Enoch (1995) for a further description of monetary policy instruments.
b.  The form of instrument use is not necessarily  exclusive.  Country sheets reflect the dominant use of
each instrument.
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Market  Orientation  (1)  of Monetary  Instrument  Use in Transition  Economies
________________Direct  Instrumentsa)  Indirect lnstrumentSb)  __________
Directed Credit  Credit Ceilings  Interest  Rate Controls  Reserve Requirements  Refinancing/Credit  Auction  T-billsICB  billscl
Countries  90 9192  9394  9091  92  939490  91 9293  94  90 91  92 93  94  90  91  92  93  9490  91 9293  94
Albania  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  __  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
Bulgaria  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1
Croatia  d)  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1
Czech  Repub  lCd)  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  _0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1
Hungary  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  iO0  0  11  1  _0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
Macedonia,  FYR  d)  00  0  010  1  1  1  00  0  11  1  _0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  00  00  0
Poland  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  _0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  i  1  0  0  1  1  1
Romania  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
Slovak  RepublijCd)  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1
Slovenia  d)  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  __0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1
Armenia  - 0  0  0  0  - I  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  6  1  - 0  0  0  0
Azerbaijan  - 0  0  0  1  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0
Belarus  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  0  0  0  - 0  0  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Estonia  - 1  1  1  1  - 1  1  1  1  - 1  1  1  1  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  1  1  - 0  0  1  1
Georgia  -0  00  1  -1  01  1  -0  00  1  - 1 0  0  0  - 0  0  1  0  - 000  0
Kazakstan  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Kyrgyz  Republic  - 0  0  0  1  - 1  1  1  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Latvia  -0  1  1  1  - 111  1i-I  1  1  1  - 0  00  1  - 1  1  1  0  -0  00  1
Lithuania  - 0  1  1  1  - 1  0  1  1  - 0  0  1  1  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  1  0  - 0  0  0  0
Moldova  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Russia  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  0  0  0  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  1
Tajikistan  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Turkmenistan  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Ukraine  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  0  0  0  - 0  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Uzbekistan  - 0  0  0  0  - 1  1  1  1  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  - 0  0  1  1  - 0  0  0  0
Mongolia  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  _  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
Notes:
a) Use of direct  instruments  as of year-end;  0 denotes  'in  use', 1 - not used,  and thus market  oriented;  see text  for criteria
b) Use of indirect  instruments  as of year-end;  I denotes  'in  use',  and thus market  oriented;  0  - not used;  see text for criteria
c) T-bills  - issued  by the Ministry  of Finance;  CB bills - issued  by the Central  Bank
d) Instrument  use shown for Czechoslovakia  and Yugoslavia,  as  appropriate,  prior to breakup
2  7Table 4b:
Market Orientation of Monetary Instrument Use in CEE at the Time of Stabilizationa)
Year T-1  Grand  Year Tb)  Grand  Year T+1b)  Grand
Total  Total  Total Countries  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total
Albania (92)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  2  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  2  3
Bulgaria (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4
Croatia (93)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  0  0  1  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  0  1  1  4
Czech Republic (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Hungary (90)  0  0  0  O  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  2  3  10  0  1  0  1  1  2  3
Macedonia, FYR (94)  0  1  1  2  1  0  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4
Poland (90)  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3
Romania (93)  0  1  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5
Slovak Republic (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Slovenia (92)  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5
Total  2  8  4  14  2  4  0  6  20  10  3  7  20  4  8  3  15  35  10  5  8  23  6  9  5  20  43
Average  0.2 0.8 0.4  1.4 0.2  0.4 0.0  0.6  2.0  1.0 0.3 0.7  2.0 0.4  0.8 0.3  1.5  3.5  1.0 0.5 0.8  2.3 0.6  0.9 0.5  2.0  4.3
Notes:
a) This  table  is derived  from Table  4a. A "1"  indicates  market-oriented  use. Year  T refers  to the  year  of the  last stabilization  attempt,
shown  in parentheses  in the  first column  (see  also Table  2).
b) If Year  Tor T+1  is 1995,  the  latest  available  infornation  is used.
28Table 4c:
Market Orientation of Monetary Instrument Use in FSU and Mongolia at the Time of Stabilizationa)
Year T-1  Grand  Year Tb)  Grand  Year T+1b)  Grand
Total  Total  Total
Countries  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total  Tota  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total  Tota  DC  CC  IRC  Total  RR  RCA TCB  Total  Total
Armenia (94)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4
Azerbaijan (95)  1  1  0  2  1  0  0  1  3  1  1  0  2  0  1  0  1  3  _
Belarus (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  1  1  0  2  4
Estonia (92)  1  1  1  3  1  0  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  1  0  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Georgia (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  3  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  3
Kazakstan (94)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  0  1  1  2  4
Kyrgyz Republic (93)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  2  0  1  0  1  3
Latvia (92)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4
Lithuania (92)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5
Moldova (93)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Russia (95)  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  2  3  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5
Tajikistan (95)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  2
Turkmenistan
Ukraine (94)  0  1  1  00  1  0  1  2  0  0  0  00  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  01  0  1  2
Uzbekistan (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Mongolia (93)  0  0  0  00  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  00  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  01  0  1  2
Total  2  14  3  19  2  10  1  13  32  6  10  6  22  2  12  1  15  37  10  9  6  25  3  11  2  16  41
Average  0.1 0.9  0.2  1.3 0.1  0.7 0.1  0.9  2.1  0.4 0.7 0.4  1.5 0.1  0.8 0.1  1.0  2.5  0.8 0.8 0.5  2.1 0.3  0.9 0.2  1.3  3.4
Notes:
a) This  table  is derived  from Table  4a. A "1"  indicates  market-oriented  use. Year  T refers  to the  year  of the  last stabilization  attempt,
shown  in parentheses  in the first  column  (see  also  Table  2).
b) If Year  Tor T+1  is 1995,  the  latest  available  information  is used.
29Table 4d:
Market Orientation
of Monetary Policy Instruments Around Stabilization  in Year T
(average indices)
All Countries
Instruments  Year T-1  Year T  Year T+1
Direct
Directed Credit  16  64  91
Credit Ceilings  88  52  64
Interest Rate Controls  28  52  64
Indirect
Reserve Requirements  16  24  38
Refinancing/Credit Auction  56  80  91
Government  paper  4  16  32
Overall Index  35  48  63
CEE Countries  FSU Countries and Mongolia
Instruments  Year T-1  Year T  Year T+1  Year T-1  Year T  Year T+1
Direct
Directed Credit  20  100  100  13  40  83
Credit Ceilings  80  30  50  93  67  75
Interest Rate Controls  40  70  80  20  40  50
Indirect
Reserve Requirements  20  40  60  13  13  25
Refinancing  40  80  90  67  80  92
Government paper  0  30  50  7  7  17
Overall  Index  33  58  72  36  42  57
Source:  Authors'  calculations;  see text for definition
"Fast Response" Countries  "Slow Response" Countries
Instruments  Year T-1  Year T  Year T+1  Year T-1  Year T  Year T+1
Direct
Directed Credit  23  85  92  8  42  89
Credit Ceilings  85  38  69  92  67  56
Interest Rate Controls  31  54  69  25  50  56
Indirect
Reserve Requirements  8  31  46  25  17  25
Refinancing  38  69  92  75  92  89
Government paper  0  23  46  8  8  11
Overall  Index  31  50  69  39  46  54
Source:  Authors'  calculations;  see text for definition
30Table 4e:
Market Orientation of Monetary Instrument Use in CEE at the Time of Stablizationa/
Year T-1  Granc  Year  Tb'  Gran  Year  T+1-'  Grand
Countries  DC  CC  IRC  Total RR  RCA TCB Total  Total DC  CC  IRC Total RR  RCA  TCB Total  Total DC  CC  IRC Total  RR  RCA  TCB  Total Total
Exchange Rate Anchor:
Czech Republic (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Poland (90)  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3
Slovak Republic (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Estonia (92)  1  1  1  3  1  0  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  1  0  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  6
Total  2  3  1  6  1  0  0  1  7  4  1  3  8  1  3  0  4  12  4  3  4  11  3  4  3  10  21
Average  0.5  0.8  0.3  1.5  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.8  1.0  0.3  0.8  2.0  0.3  0.8  0.0  1.0  3.0  0.8  0.8  1.0  2.8  0.8  1.0  0.8  2.5  5.3
Money Followed by ER Anchor:
Croatia (93)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  0  0  1  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  0  1  1  4
Latvia (92)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4
Lithuania (92)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5
Total  0  3  2  5  0  2  0  2  7  3  2  2  7  1  1  1  3  10  3  3  3  9  1  2  1  4  13
Average  0.0  1.0  0.7  1.7  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.7  2.3  1.0 0.7  0.7  2.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.0  3.3  1.0  1.0  1.0  3.0  0.3  0.7  0.3  1.3  4.3
Money Anchor:
Albania (92)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  2  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  2  3
Armenia (94)  0  1  01  0000  101  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4
Azerbaijan (95)  1  1  0  2  1  0  0  1  3  1  1  0  2  0  1  0  1  3
Belarus (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  1  1  0  2  4
Bulgaria (91)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4
Georgia (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  3  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  3
Hungary (90)  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  2  3  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  2  3
Kazakstan (94)  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  0  1  1  2  0  1  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  0  1  1  2  4
Kyrgyz Republic (93)  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  2  0  1  0  1  3
Macedonia, FYR (94)  0  1  1  2  1  0  0  1  3  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  4
Moldova (93)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Mongolia (93)  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Romania (93)  0  1  1  2  1  1  0  2  4  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5  1  1  1  3  1  1  0  2  5
Russia (95)  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  2  3  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5
Slovenia (92)  1  1  1  3  0  1  0  1  4  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5  1  1  1  3  0  1  1  2  5
Tajikistan (95)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  2
Ukraine (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Uzbekistan (94)  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2
Total  2  16  4  22  3  12  1  16  38  9  10  8  27  4  16  3  23  50  13  8  7  28  5  14  3  22  50
Average  0.1  0.9  0.2  1.2  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.9  2.1  0.5  0.6  0.4  1.5  0.2  0.9  0.2  1.3  2.8  0.7  0.4  0.4  1.6  0.3  0.8  0.2  1.2  2.8
Notes:
a.  This  table is derived  from Table  4a. A "1 indicates  market-oriented  use.  Year  T refers  to the  year of the last  stabilization  attempt,  shown  in parentheses  in the first column  (see  also Table  2).
b.  If Year T  or T+  1  is 1995,  the latest available  information  is used.
31Table  5:
Indicators of Monetary Policy Stance, 1990-94 (CEE and Mongolia)  and 1992-94 (FSU and FYRs)
(percent)
Average Real Discount
Average Growth Rate  Average Growth Rate  Effectiveness  of  Rate,
of Base  Moneya)  of Broad  Moneya)  Credit  CeilingsC)  19 92-94 d)
Group  1 - moderate
Albania  66  79  E  -11
Bulgaria  31  60  E*  -11
Czech Republicb)  29  18  E*  -4
Hungary  28  23  E*  2
Poland  51  66  E*  3
Romania  78  98  NE  -23
Slovak Republicb)  24  13  E*  -5
Slovenia  76  77  NU  -12
Estonia  91  52  NU  n.a.
Latvia  64  95  E*  -21
Group - Average  54  58  -9
Group 2 - loose
FYR Macedonia  248  970  E  20
Kyrgyz Republic  284  242  E*  -41
Lithuania  127  175  E*  n.a.
Moldova  352  265  NU  -43
Mongolia  144  84  E  -53
Group Average  231  347  -29
Group  3 - very  loose
Croatia  534  587  NU  -28
Armenia  1711  970  NU  -82
Azerbaijan  652  733  NU  -88
Belarus  993  1115  NU  -80
Georgia  1978  2447  NE  -94 e)
Kazakstan  843  600  NE  -72
Russia  650  437  NE  -41
Tajikistan  1113  722  NE  -56
Turkmenistan  742  875  NU  -91
Ukraine  2009  1070  E  -59
Uzbekistan  552  644  NU  -85
Group Average  1071  927  -70
32Source: IMF and IBRD reports, country Central Bank bulletins, Banerjee et al. (1995), Citrin & Lahiri (1995),
Ebril et al. (1994)
a) Average of December/December  growth rates; Broad Money includes foreign exchange deposits
b) 1990-92:  data on the former federation; 1992  - base money estimated  from the CB balance sheet
c) E =Effectively used; still used as of end-1994
E*=Effectively used; terminated
NE=Not  always enforced
NU= Not used, or used only for a short period of time
d) The real discount rate is calculated as [(I + i)/(i + Tc]  -1, where i refers to the quoted central bank
discount/refinancing rate and 7z  refers to the quarterly eop CPI-based  inflation. The period rate is based on
quarterly average rates.
e) Average for 1992-93.
NB The group classification is based on average annual base money growth:
- Group  1: <  100%
- Group 2: >  100% and <400%
- Group  3: > 400%
33Table 6:
Indicators of Effectiveness  of Monetary  Policy
(percent)
Average CPI/RPI Inflation  Domestic M2/GDP  Real GDP Growth
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Group I
Albania  2  36  226  85  23  31  45  31  26  27  -10  -28  -10  11  7
Bulgaria  26  334  82  73  96  89  37  44  49  41  -9  -12  -7  -2  1
Czech Republicb)  10  57  11  21  10  64  57  62  63  69  0  -14  -6  -1  3
Hungary  29  35  23  22  19  35  33  36  37  33  -4  -12  -3  -1  3
Poland  586  70  43  35  33  14  22  21  22  22  -12  -7  3  4  6
Romania  5  175  211  256  131  53  26  19  11  10  -6  -13  -9  1  4
Slovak Republicb)  11  61  10  23  14  64  57  63  57  55  0  -15  -6  -4  5
Slovenia  550  118  201  32  20  15  12  10  13  16  -5  -8  -5  1  6
Estonia  23  211  1076  90  48  67  49  14  19  18  -8  -11  -14  -7  -3
Latvia  4  124  951  109  36  67  42  12  16  21  3  -8  -35  -15  2
Group Average  125  122  283  75  43  50  38  31  31  31  -5  -13  -9  -1  3
Group 2
FYR Macedonia  608  115  1691  350  122  15  18  8  8  12  -10  -12  -21  -8  -4
Kyrgyz Republic  3  85  855  1209  280  67  43  13  8  9  3  -5  -25  -16  -27
Lithuania  8  225  1021  409  72  67  44  11  9  12  -5  -13  -38  -24  2
Moldova  4  98  1208  1283  587  67  n.a.  21  8  6  -2  -18  -29  -1  -31
Mongolia  2  33  203  269  87  54  41  26  11  15  -2  -9  -10  -3  2
Group Average  125  111  995  704  230  54  37  16  9  11  -3  -11  -25  -10  -12
Group 3
Croatia  610  123  666  1518  98  15  15  9  6  10  -9  -14  -9  -3  1
Armenia  10  100  825  3732  5273  67  74  30  11  4  -7  -11  -52  -15  5
Azerbaijan  8  106  616  1130  1664  67  79  19  21  12  -12  -1  -23  -23  -21
Belarus  5  84  969  1188  2220  67  50  14  8  5  -3  -1  -10  -12  -20
Georgia  3  79  887  3125  18922  67  n.a.  22  3  1  -12  -14  -40  -39  -35
Kazakstan  4  91  1381  1662  1880  67  70  15  11  4  0  -13  -13  -12  -25
Russia  6  93  1353  896  302  67  58  14  10  10  -4  -13  -15  -9  -13
Tajikistan  4  112  1157  2195  341  67  n.a.  27  32  n.a.  -2  -7  -29  -11  -21
Turkmenistan  5  103  493  3102  2400  67  64  12  13  6  2  -5  -5  -10  -20
Ukraine  4  91  1210  4735  891  67  67  22  10  10  -3  -12  -17  -17  -23
Uzbekistan  3  82  645  534  1568  67  64  33  20  13  2  -1  -11  -2  -4
Group Average  60  97  927  2165  3233  62  60  20  13  8  -4  -8  -20  -14  -16
Source:  EBRD, IFS, IMF reports
34TABLE 7:
Comparison of Average Financial Ratios
Across Country Groups
M2/GDP (including FX deposits)b)  1989  1991  1993  1994e)
High-income  68  79  80  75
Upper-middle income  51  42  47  50
Lower-middle incomec)  42  39  40  39
Low-income  24  31  29  34
Transition economies:d)
- CEE  55  39  43  42
- FSU and Mongolia  54  62  20  17
- East Asia  42  50  53  54
Source:  WDR,  1991,  1993,  1995; IMF
Notes:
a) Income  groups  as defined  in the World  Bank  World  Development  Reports
b) M2 calculated  as the average  of the  year-end  figures  for the  specified  and  the  previous  year
c) Bolivia  excluded  in 1991,  because  it is an extremely  high outlier
d) Not  included  in the  previous  categories
e) Country  breakdown  as for 1993,  except  Portugal  is in the  high-income  group  (upper-middle  income  in 1993)
35TABLE 8:
Use of Market-Oriented Instruments, Policy Stance
and Effectiveness during and after Stabilizationa'
Policy Stance
Market-Orientation
of Instruments  Moderate  Loose  Very Loose
High  2-;,j  .s
(5-6 instruments)  Latvia (92)
*Romania (93)
*Russia (95)bICI
Substantial  . *Azerbaijan (95)bICI  *Armenia (94)C'152,
(4-4.5 instruments)  -,  *Georgia (94)CX
Hungary  (90)  *Kazakstan (94)CI
*FYR Macedonia (94)g
Moderate






(2-2.5 instruments)  Albania (92)
*Ukraine (94) cl
*Indicates  countries  stabilizing  relatively  slowly.
a/ The use of market-oriented  instruments  is shown  as an average  of years  T and  T+1.
Policy  stance  is also  an average  for years  T and  T+1  with categories  for base  money
growth  defined  as in Table 5. Effectiveness,  shown  by shading,  is  defined  by inflation
in year  T+1 less than 100  and  less than  inflation  in year  T and a stable  or increasing
ratio  of M2/GDP  by year  T+1. Turkemenistan  is excluded,  as it had not adopted  a stabilization  program  by
end-  1995.
b/ Based  on data  for year  T only.
c/ Base  money  growth  and inflation  for 1995  are mid-year  estimates  annualized.
36Table 9:
Simple Correlations Between Base Money Growth, Inflation and the MOMPla)  Index
Correlation Coefficients  Year T-1  Year Tb) YearT+1c)  Average
1. Overalld)
Base Money Growth - Inflatione)  f)  0.96  0.86  0.79  0.95
Base Money Growth - MOMPI Indexe)  f)  -0.11  -0.14  -0.12  -0.34
Inflation - MOMPI Index  -0.04  -0.15  -0.20  -0.25
2a. CEE Countries
Base Money Growth - Inflatione)  f)  0.79  0.96  0.86  0.98
Base Money Growth - MOMPI Indexe)  f)  0.22  0.27  -0.26  0.12
Inflation - MOMPI Index  0.52  0.21  -0.34  0.17
2b. FSU Countries and Mongolia
Base Money Growth - Inflatione)  0.96  0.84  0.71  0.93
Base Money Growth - MOMPI Indexe)  -0.29  -0.06  0.09  -0.33
Inflation - MOMPI Index  -0.19  0.00  0.03  -0.16
3a"Fast Response" Countries
Base Money Growth - Inflation  f)  0.83  0.73  0.83  0.84
Base Money Growth - MOMPI Indexf)  0.08  0.12  -0.24  -0.15
Inflation - MOMPI Index  0.11  -0.03  -0.34  -0.18
3b. "Slow Response" Countries
Base Money Growth - Inflatione)  0.96  0.86  0.97  0.94
Base Money Growth - MOMPI Indexe)  -0.51  -0.22  0.05  -0.49
Inflation - MOMPI Index  -0.37  -0.16  0.01  -0.28
Source: Authors' calculations
Notes:
a) Market Orientation of Monetary Policy Instruments; see text for definition
The 1995 data are annualized mid-year numbers
b) The year of the latest stabilization effort as reported in Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (1995)
c) The following countries, in which stabilization started in 1995, are excluded: Azerbaijan, Russia,
Tajikistan; Uzbekistan is excluded due to lack of data
d) Turkmenistan is excluded from all calculations since no stabilization has started before 1995;
For the following countries and years, domestic broad money growth is substituted for base money growth:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania in year T-1 (1991), Latvia in year T (1992), Uzbekistan in year T (1994)
e) Tajikistan is excluded due to lack of monetary data
f) Slovenia is excluded in year T-1 (1991) due to lack of monetary data
37Table 10:
Time Span of Data for the Regressions
M2/GDP  LNINF  )
Albania  1990-94  1990-94
Bulgaria  1990-94  1990-94
Croatiab)  1990-94  1990-94
Czech Republic')  1990-94  1990-94
Hungary  1989-94  1989-94
Macedonia, FYRb)  1990-94  1990-94
Poland  1989-94  1989-94
Romania  1990-94  1990-94
Slovak Republicc)  1990-94  1990-94
Sloveniab)  1990-94  1990-94
Armenia  1991-94  1991-94
Azerbaijan  1991-94  1991-94
Belarus  1991-94  1991-94
Estonia')  --  1991  -94
Georgia  1991-94  1991-94
Kazakhstan  1991-94  1991-94
Kyrgyz Republic  1991-94  1991-94
Latvia  1991-94  1991-94
Lithuania  1991-94  1991-94
Moldova  1991-94  1991-94
Russia  1991-94  1991-94
Tajikistan  1991-94  1991-94
Turkmenistan  1991-94  1991-94
Ukraine  1991-94  1991-94
Uzbekistan  1991-94  1991-94
Mongolia  1990-94  1990-94
a) Natural  logarithm  of inflation  measured  by the  CPI
b) Data  for former  Yugoslavia  used  in 1989-1990
c) Data  for former  CSFR  used  in 1989-1991
d) Estonia  is not included  as no discount  rate is used  under
the  currency  board  arrangement
38Table 11:  Effectiveness and Market-oriented  Instruments: Financial Depth
(Dependent variable: M2GDP)
Equation  I  Equation  2  Equation  3
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistics  Coefficient  t-statistics
M2GDPLAG  .31  2.91  .294  2.99  .37  3.83
PLIB  -.11  -1.35  -.10  -1.35  -.16  -2.21
RDR  .13  3.50  .12  3.40  .12  3.31
T  -.58  -2.88  -.05  -3.70  -.05  -3.01
DC  -.002  -.05  - - -
CC  .07  2.34  .06  2.13  -
IRC  -.02  -.37  - - -
RR.  -.03  -.55  - - -
RCA  .04  1.10  - - -
TCB  .09  1.96  .06  1.73  -
MOMPI  --  .09  1.02
FE1 (Albania)  .45  4.07  .43  5.03  .37  4.24
FE2 (Bulgaria)  .49  5.31  .49  5.85  .44  4.92
FE3 (Croatia)  .21  3.15  .21  3.44  .24  3.66
FE4 (Czech  .53  5.55  .55  6.33  .53  5.93
Republic)
FE5 (Hungary)  .33  3.73  .37  5.45  .38  5.17
FE6 (Macedonia,  .25  2.69  .21  2.42  .19  2.51
FYR)
FE7 (Poland)  .29  4.06  .31  4.68  .29  4.24
FE8 (Romania)  .31  3.68  .29  3.69  .27  3.09
FE9 (Slovak  .51  5.51  .53  6.19  .50  5.76
Republic)
FE1O (Slovenia)  .16  1.93  .20  3.04  .23  3.26
FEll  (Armenia)  .20  2.47  .23  3.24  .24  3.47
FE12  (Azerbaijan)  .39  2.66  .39  2.87  .39  3.04
FE13 (Belarus)  .26  2.84  .27  3.41  .27  3.76
FE 14 (Estonia)  - - -
FE15 (Georgia)  .16  2.05  .19  2.76  .20  2.98
FE16 (Kazakhstan)  .19  2.39  .21  2.70  .20  2.68
FE17 (Kyrgyz  .22  3.19  .23  3.60  .24  3.63
Republic)
FE18 (Latvia)  .24  3.32  .24  3.79  .24  3.49
FE19 (Lithuania)  .32  3.03  .29  3.27  .26  2.62
FE20 (Moldova)  .15  1.95  .18  2.71  .20  3.07
FE21 (Russia)  .14  1.55  .18  2.50  .21  3.18
FE22  (Tajkistan)  .38  3.92  .41  4.83  .42  4.76
FE23 (Turkmenistan)  .22  2.11  .24  2.39  .25  2.48
FE24 (Ukraine)  .21  2.55  .24  3.44  .23  3.36
FE25 (Uzbekistan)  .31  3.47  .33  4.33  .33  4.33
FE26 (Mongolia)  .37  5.18  .39  5.78  .37  5.23
Adjusted  R2 .82  .83  .81
DW  2.10  2.13  2.09
39Table 12:
Effectiveness and Market-oriented Instruments:  Inflation
(Dependent Variable:  log of inflation (CPI))
Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistics  Coefficient  t-statistics
LNINFLAG  .47  7.26  .43  7.80  .48  7.92
RESM  .09  5.67  .10  6.95  .10  6.03
PLIB  1.54  2.65  1.55  3.47  .82  1.36
T  -.19  -1.44  -.18  -1.75  -.31  -2.38
DC  -1.04  -3.02  -.91  -3.82  - -
CC  -0.22  -0.81  - -
IRC  .25  .92
RR  -.12  -.46  - - -
RCA  -.55  -2.17  -.49  -2.19  -
TCB.  -.18  -.52  - -
MOMPI  - - - - -1.60  -3.07
Constant  1.43  3.11  1.34  4.04  1.78  4.36
AdjustedR2 .79  .74  .76
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41Figure  2:
Sequencing  of Market-Oriented  Use of Monetary  Instruments
in Transition  Economies  during  Stabilization
(averages for 25 countries)
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Country  Table
Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
..............  ........................................................  .......................................................................  ........................  ........................  ........................  .............................  ...........................................
1  Directed credits  credit plan was in  directed credit  guarantees discounted in
place until 92  abandoned in 92; credit  94
guarantees for  some
enterprises introduced
in 93
2  Credit ceilings  not used  bank-by-bank ceilings  ceilings maintained and
introduced in mid-92;  lowered  in 94
tradeable since late 94
3  Interest rate controls  on  fixed rates until  max. and min. rates
commercial  bank  mid-92  since mid-92 aimed at
deposit/lending  rates  keeping positive real
rates
................................  ............................  .............  ..............  .................................  ..................................................................................................................  ..................................  ......................
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
....I...........................................................  .......  .......................................................................  ...................  .................  .....................................................................................  ................
4  Reserve  requirements  not used  introduced  mid-92 at  rates unchanged since
10% for all deposits;  mid-92; by end 93  all
poor compliance initially  banks are meeting RR
................................................................  ......  .......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  not used  introduced  in 93 but
limited  use
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  primary market




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  operated  in 93 directed credit program  directed credit abolished
under  credit  transferred  to MoF  in 1/95
plan until 92
....................................  ............................................  ..................  .......................................  ........................................  ...........................................................................................................
2  Credit  ceilings  not used
3  Interest  rate  controls  fixed administered  rates for  loan rate controls were
on  commercial  bank  directed  credit between  92-  removed  in 6/94 and
deposit/lending  rates  1/95; minimum  deposit  and  deposit rate controls in
loan rates  were introduced  in  late 94
3/94
,..........  ..................  .....................................  ......  ........................................  ............................  ............  ........................................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in late 93; unified
at 15% for all dram and FX
deposits  in late 94; Savings
Bank is excluded
,...................................................................  ........................................  ....................  ..................  .. ................  ............................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  preferential  rates for directed  auction redesigned  and
credit until 94; auction  expanded  in 2/95
introduced  in 5/94 with  without minimum
interest rate minimum  interest rate
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities




Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used according to  used extensively between  92-
credit plan until 92  95; share decreasing since late
94
2  Credit ceilings  not used
..................................................... I................................................  .......................  ..................................................................  ..................................................................................................................
3  Interest rate controls  3% margin for lending rates in
on commercial  bank  91,  increased to  10%  in 93
deposit/lending  rates
.............................................................................................................................  ............................  .......................................  - .......................................-  - - - - I.........  ......  ..  ....  .......  .........................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
........................................  ......................................  ................................................................................  ..........................................  ..................................  ........  ..........................................................
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 91 w/
15/12/10%  by maturity;  4
largest banks exempt  7/93
extended to  FX deposits;  low
compliance; RR  extended to all
banks in 1/94, high variability
in 95
..........................................................................................................................  .. .................................................................................  ............................... I..............................................
5  Refinance  window  preferential  since 1/95 refinance at single  refinance rate based
refinancing since 92  rate  on auctions since 3/95
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities




Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
.............  ........................................................  .......  ...................................................  ......... .....................................................................................................................................................
1  Directed  credits  used according to credit plan  15% of DMB loans must be for
until 93  investment in 94; CB directed
credit continues at subsidized
rates in 95
.....................................................................  ........  ............................... I............................  ...................  ..................................................................................................................................
2  Credit  ceilings  not used  no bank-by-bank  ceiling but a
5% of GDP  ceiling on the CB
credit to govt in 93
3  Interest  rate  controls  a 3% margin between deposit  min. rates on time deposits in
on  commercial  bank  and loan rates, later cancelled,  10/94, average  rates' margin
deposit/lending  rates  lending rate set at 25% in 91;  reset at 3% in 1/95, raised  to
9/94 margins controlled but  5% in 6/95
changing; Savings  Bank deposit
rates controlled in 93-94
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 88; 7/91 indicative
ratios 1  5-1  2% by maturity; 2/92
raised  to 20%; 2/93 RR
differentiated by banks 8-1  5%;
Saving Bank exempt in 10/93;
4/94 uniform for all banks 1  5%
on DD and 10% on TSD;10/94
RR  set at 5.5% and FX
included;7/95 RR  set at 12% on
LC and 10% on FX deposits
......................................................................  ...................................................................  ............................................................................................................  ......................  ...................
5  Refinance  window  introduced in 91; preferential  auctions started in 2/93;
rates for directed credit  suspended  in 10/93; resumed in
4/94; limited because of other
cheap credit
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombardf
acilities
6  Gov't and CB  bills  gov't paper introduced 2/94; CB




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A. DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  Agricultural  loans directed
through banks 91-95
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ......  ...............
2  Credit ceilings  bank-by-bank ceilings  abandoned in 8/94
introduced in 2/91;  two
large banks exempt but
included in 1/92; ceilings
made tradeable in 7/92
3  Interest rate controls  fixed  rates abolished  formally  market
on commercial  bank  in 2/91  determined but
deposit/lending  rates  influenced by CB
refinancing rates
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced at 7% in 2/91 on
all types of deposits;  no
change between 2/91  -
8/94;  upward drift  and 3
changes between 8/94-
8/95  increasing to  12%
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  for agricultural loans  some refinancing at the
at preferential rates  discount rate between 91-
since 1/91 to 1/95  93;  auctions of CB deposits
date  at DMBs intoduced in 9/91
but terminated in 1994
and  introduced in late  funds limited to 70% of  fully  developed
Rediscount/Lombard  91;  funds limited to  collateral's  face value in 92
facilities  90%  of collateral's
face value
.......  .....  ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  introduced in 7/91  secondary market trading  OMO after  8/94
bonds  since 1993
54CROATIA
Country  Table
Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  preferential  credit  quotas on preferential  credit
to agriculture  on  introduced  in 4/92; and
demand  between  subsumed  under  general
6/91-4/92  refinancing  1/93
..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................  ........ I...........................................  ..  . . . . . . . . . . . .........................-..............................................  ..........  .........  ....... ......  ..........  ..........  ....
2  Credit  ceilings  bank-by-bank  ceilings  used
only between 5/95-7/95 to
cope with a transitory
surge in credit demand
..................................................  ...................  ........  ..............................................................  ............................................  ... ........................ I...................  .......  ........................  .............................................
3  Interest  rate  controls  not used
on commercial  bank
deposit/lending  rates
....................................................................  . . . .-  . . . . ........  ........................  .......................................  ............  ............  ... .. ..... .. ....... ..... ....  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 12/91; DD and TD
w/maturity less than 3 months
13%, other TSD 5.5%;
obligatory  NBC  bills at 8.6% of
all deposits  subsumed  under
enforced  RR;  obligatory  CB  bills
reintroduced  early 95; as of
7/95 average  RR  was 34%
......................................................................  ....................................................  .....................  .........  ........  ..... .. .... ........  ..  ......  .... ....... ..... .............  ............  ..............  .........  ............................
5  Refinance  window  a quarterly  quota  general  purpose  refinancing
on ST refinancing  discontinued  in 9/93
6/91-9/93
and  lombard  facility introduced  in
Rediscount/Lombard  late 93
facilities
..........  ............................................................  .................  .................................  ....................  ................  .....  .........  .........  ..................  .......................  .............................................  ...................................
6  Gov't  and  CB  bill  and  CB  bills introduced  no secondary  trade in gov't
bonds  in late 91; gov't  securities;  primary  sales  and





Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  not used
2  Credit ceilings  Bank-by-bank ceilings starting
1/91; ceilings terminated in
4/92  for small banks and
10/92  for big banks
3  Interest rate controls  ceiling on lending rates  market-determined
on commercial  bank  introduced from  1/91 to 4/92  since 92
deposit/lending  rates
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 1990,  high initial  unchanged since
levels (16-18%);  lowered  and  8/94,  DD:3%;
differentiated  by deposit  TSD:12%
maturity in 2/92
5  Refinance  window  introduced in early 1991  auctions introduced
in early 1992 and
terminated  in 6/94
and  introduced in 93  fully  developed since
Rediscount/Lombard  94
facilities
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  introduced in early  secondary market trade  OMO started since
bonds  1992  93
56ESTONIA
Country Table
Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
,UMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
LDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  not used
2  Credit ceilings  not used
3  Interest rate controls  fully  market based since
on commercial bank  mid-92
deposit/lending  rates ......................................................................  ....................................................  ....  ...............  ..................... I.................................................  ...........................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in late 1991  FX and government
at 10% on all deposits  deposits subjected  to RR
in early-1 994;  strictly
enforced
5  Refinance window  not used
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't  and CB bills and  no government  CB CDs auctioned off  to
bonds  securities issued;  provide instruments for




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
............. I............  ............................................  ................................  ..................  .....................  ..................  .. ...................  .............  .............  ......  ........  . .............  ............................  ......  .....





................... I............I.............................  ..........  ................  .-.............................  .........................  ........  ......  .... ... .................  ....... .......................  ..............  ..........  ... ......  ...  ....  ............................
2  Credit ceilings  not used  bank-by-bank ceilings,
not tradeable,
introduced in 94
.....  .....  ..  .......  ...................... I.... ...................  ...... .......  ......  .. .... .. ............  ...  ...... ......  ....  .... .. .... ....  ............-............  .................  ........  ...................................  .................................
3  Interest rate controls  market determined rates
on commercial  bank  since monetary
deposit/lending  rates  independence in 4/92
.................................................  . .. I  .........................  .................................................................  -...-  . ..............................  ................  .......................  ...........
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  minimum liquidity  RR introduced at 1  5-  declined to 8% for DD,
ratio (quasi  30% for  DD, 5.5%  for  3.5-5.5%  for TSD by
RR)introduced in  TSD in 92;  1994;  enforced
91  at 2.5%
.............. I.......................  ............-...................  ... ..........  ........  ......  .... ... ... ........ ...........  ....... .... ..  ...  ............................................  ..................................  .....
5  Refinance  window  prior to 94  all selective
credits automatically
refinanced at single rate
6  Rediscount/Lombard  not used  discount facility
facilities  introduced  93/94
7  Gov't and CB bills  and  compulsory  CB
bonds  bills intoduced in





Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used according to credit  used directly for firms and  practically eliminated
plan  through banks at preferential  by late 94
rates in 92 and 93
..............................................................  ....  . .................................................................  .............................................  .........................................................................................................
2  Credit  ceilings  bank-by-bank ceilings introduced
in early 92 abandoned in late 92
3  Interest  rate controls  formally liberalized in 91, except  market determined by
on commercial  bank  the Savings Bank  mid-94
deposit/lending  rates
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 91 at 5 to 10%;
state banks de facto exempt; lax
enforcement; increased  to 20%
on local currency deposits in 93;
FX deposits became subject to
RR in early 94 at 1  5%; increased
to 20% in late 94; RR  compliance
improved in 95
............................... I...................................  . .................................................................  ......................................................................... I..............................  .................................................  ......................
5  Refinance  window  not used  refinancing auction introduced in  auctions resumed in
1  2/93 and suspended in 5/94  4/95;  interbank
auction introduced in
5/95
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  preferential program  sectoral coverage of preferential  By 95 directed credit
since 1989  programs reduced sharply by 93;  less than 25%  of total
pre-export  finance and  and diminishing in
privatization credits put in place  importance
at low rates
.............  ..................  ......................................  ..................................  .......................................  ...........................................................  ........................  ..........  .......  ..................................  .....
2  Credit ceilings  bank-by-bank credit ceilings in
place in 89; eliminated in late 91
3  Interest rate  fixed rates for  market determined since
controls  on  enterprises until 87  93
commercial  bank  and for households
deposit/lending  until 91/92
rates
..  ..............  ........................................................................................................  ............................................................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
.............  ..................  ..............  ................  .............................................................  ......................................  ...............................  .......  .......................................................................
4  Reserve  introduced with  differentiated
requirements  rates in 87; simplified and unified
in 90 at 18%;  changed 5 times
between 90-95  and reduced to
12%  in late 94;  increased to
14% in 2/95
5  Refinance  window  automatic access  quotas on automatic  refinancing
and preferential rates  of selected activities  introduced
used for selected  in 91;  switch  to refinance
activities  since 89  auctions also in late 91; multiple
refinancing rates exist but their
importance is declining
and  discount  rate applicable
Rediscount/Lombar  to non-directed credit;
d facilities  lombard  facility
introduced  in 93
6  Gov't and CB bills  introduced in 88  secondary market dominated by  OMO used since 90;
and bonds  CB; significant direct sales to  OMO became main
general public in 94  policy instrument  was in





Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
INSTRUMENTS
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
.....................................................................  ..................................  ....................................  .....................................................  ...................................  .................................  .............  ........
1  Directed credits  used according to  bank-by-bank quotas since  virtually  eliminated in
credit plan until 92  92; one-time direct lending to  early 1  995
enterprises to clear their
arrears; tightening of quotas
late 94.
...................-...................................................  ...............................  ............................ I...........  ..........  ...................................................................................................................  .......  ........
2  Credit ceilings  bank-by-bank ceilings 1  2/90  ceiling put on CB net
often exceeded until late 94  domestic  assets in 95
......................................................................  .................................  .....................................  ......................................  ........................  ........................  .......................................  ................
3  Interest rate controls  fixed interest rates  formally market determined  mainly market
on commercial  bank  before 92  since 93, but heavily  determined  since 95
deposit/lending  rates  influenced by subsidized CB
refinance rates for most
directed credit
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 91,  RR unified at 20%  on
differentiated  up to  1  5%;  all types  of deposits in
unified at 18%  in 92  2/95
increased to 30%  in 94 for
domestic deposits and 1  5%
RR imposed on FX deposits
5  Refinance  window  introduced in 91 on a quota
basis; switch  to monthly
auctions since 1/93;
intentions to auction all CB
credit since 4/95  not yet
achieved
and  introduced  in 9/95
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't and CB bills and  secondary market trade  short term CB bills
bonds  started in the second half of  introduced in 6/95;




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
...................................................................  . ......  ................  ............................................  ......  ................................................................................................................................  ...................
1  Directed credits  used according to credit  bank-by-bank credit  directed credit virtually
plan until 92 at  quotas since 91  eliminated since late 94
preferential rates
...................................................................  . .......................  ................  ...........................  ...... I................  ................ I................................  ........................................................................  .........
2  Credit ceilings  not used  bank by bank credit  ceilings in CB NDA in 95
ceiling set to zero in 94
...................................................................  . .......................  .................................  ..........  ........................................  ................................  ................  ................................................................
3  Interest rate controls  rates of Savings Bank  since 92/93,  rates  virtually  all interest rates
on commercial  bank  fixed until end-91  liberalized except directed  are market determined
deposit/lending  rates  credit  since late-94
..........................................................  . ........  .................................................  ..................  .................................................  ................................  ..........................................................  .........
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 91,
differentiated  up to  1  5%,
limited application;  rates
progressively raised to
30%  RR  enforced since
early 95  at continuing
high rates
..........................................................  . ........  ...................................................................  ................  ................  ................  ................................  ....................................................................
5  Refinance  window  introduced at single rate
in late 93  but tightly
controlled
and  introduced 8/93 for  fully  developed since early
Rediscount/Lombard  limited short-term  95
facilities  borrowing;  emergency
liquidity facility
introduced  late 94
..........................................................  . ........  ................................  ................  .........  ..........  ......  ............  ................................  ................  ............................................................................
6  Gov't and CB bills  introduced  5/93 at fixed






Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  used according to  phased out gradually after  eliminated by 93
credit  plan until  curency reform in mid-92
mid 92
2  Credit ceilings  quarterly  ceiling on CB  CB NDA ceiling replaced
NDA w/  indicative ceilings  by quarterly  base money
on banking systems'  NDA  ceiling in 93; the former
between 7-1 2/92  reinstated  in mid-94  plus
indicative  ceilings on
base money and NDA of
the banking system
,  .......................................................  .............................  .......................................  .......................................................................................................  .......
3  Interest rate controls  DMBs liberalized interest
on commercial  bank  rates and Bank of Latvia
deposit/lending  rates  discontinued  all
subsidized lending in mid-
92
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 91 at 15%  unified and lowered to
on all deposits;  RR  8%  including FX deposits
increased to 20%  and  in 7/93; enforced
differentiated  in 7/92
5  Refinance  window  refinance facility  available
at the discount rate in 91;
switch  to auctions in late
93; emergency refinance
facility  introduced in 2/95
and  not used  Lombard introduced in  since 10/95  all
Rediscount/Lombard  mid-93 with  rate 5%  refinancing  required
facilities  above the discount rate  collateral
.......................................  ............................  ..............................................  ......  ..........................................................................................................................  .........................................................
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  primary market  secondary trade window





Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS






......................................................................  ........................................................................  . . . . . . . . . ..  . . -............................................................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2  Credit ceilings  tradeable bank-by-bank ceilings  bank-by-bank ceilings
and ceiling on net domestic  removed in 7/93;  CB net
assets of the CB introduced in  domestic  asset ceiling
92  discontinued  after  3/94
with  the  introduction  of
currency board
3  Interest rate controls  lending rate ceilings until 2/92  market determined by
on commercial  bank  then replaced by a minimum  95
deposit/lending  rates  deposit rate; ceiling on lending
rates put back in 9/93
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
......................................................................  ......................................................................  .........................................................................................................................................  .........
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 92 at  10% on all  reduced to  10% in 4/95
deposits; increased to  1  2%
and extended to FX deposits in
93;  strictly enforced
5  Refinance  window  not used  auction based since
5/93
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  introduced in 7/94,




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used  according  to  during  92-93 credit was
the credit plan  directed  to agro-industry,
through 91  agriculture  and energy
sectors at preferential
rates; by end 94 directed
credit declined  to 30% of
total
2  Credit  ceilings  not used
3  Interest  rate  controls  ceiling  on DMB loan rates  rates  liberalized  after
on commercial  bank  introduced  in 1/92;  4/94 for other than
deposit/lending  rates  margins  imposed  for  directed credit; rates
lending  rates  between  heavily  influenced  by CB
11/93-4/94  auction  rate
....................  . . . ................  . . . . . . . ....  . . . . . . ...............................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  not used  introduced  in 93; 5  RR  unified at 12% on all
changes  between  93-94;  deposits  in 12/94
DD 10-28, TSD 7.5-17%
.............................................................................  ...........  ............................  .........................................................................  ...................................................................................  ..............
5  Refinance  window  introduced  in late 92  switch to auction
determined  refinance
rates in 11/93
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't  and  CB bills  and  primary  market




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  used according to the  issued to priority sectors and  terminated in mid-94;
credit plan until 91  oil imports at low  rates;  a CB facility  used for
volume 1/3 of the total  in 93  the purpose
terminated  in 1/95
2  Credit ceilings  bank-by-bank ceilings
introduced  in 1/91; removed
in 5/91;  reinstated in late 92;
on monthly  basis since 9/93;
still used as of end-95
3  Interest rate controls  DMB rates liberalized in 8/91;  non-binding guidelines
on commercial  bank  min. deposit rate introduced  to reduce DMBs
deposit/lending  rates  in late-92  spread to  5% in 94
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced in 8/91  at 20%  on
business deposits,  1  5%
household DD, 5% on TSD;
8/93  RR  unified at 14%;
6/94 raised to  17%
5  Refinance  window  general refinancing  regular auction
available at  refinancing  at market-
preferential rates  determined rates since
3/95
and  ST liquidity credit issued via a
Rediscount/Lombard  clearing window  93-95;  limits
facilities  on its use since 1/95
6  Gov't and CB bills  1  1/93 CB introduced




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used  for priority sectors  discontinued  by 93
since 80s
2  Credit  ceilings  informal bank-by-bank
ceilings  89-early  93
3  Interest  rate  controls  fixed administered  basically  liberalized  in 1/90  market determined
on  commercial  bank  rates  until 8/89 for  but strongly influenced  by  since early 93
deposit/lending  rates  priority sectors  CB
...........  ......................................................  ..............  ......................................  ........................................................................................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  1/90 w/ high and
changing  levels;  range;  DD
9-30%; TD 5-15%; SD 5-
10%; in late 94 lowered  DD
20%
...................................................................  . ..............................................................................................................................................................  ............................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  available  at  refinance  operations  more  fully developed
preferential  rates  market oriented
since 1/90
and  available  since 8/90
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't  and  CB bills  CB  bills introduced  1-3 year bonds  introduced  OMO  since early 93;
and  bonds  7/90 and replaced  in 92; limited secondary  fully developed




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  special credit to deal  92-/93  special credit lines  special credit lines
w/  interenterprise  for LT credit to various  marginalized in 8/93;
arrears end 91;  sectors at preferential rates some directed credit at
repaid mid-92  the official  discount rate
still available in 1995
...............................................................................................  ......................................  ..................................................  ............  ...............  ........... I................  .................  .....................................
2  Credit ceilings  used for some time in 91
but lifted  in the second
half of 92
...........................................................................................................................  ....................................................................................................  ................................................................
3  Interest rate controls  on  Savings Bank rates  market determined by
commercial  bank  controlled for some time  1995
deposit/lending  rates
..........................................................................................  ................................  ....................................................................  .................................  ..............................................................
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced for enterprise
deposits in 92;  12/92  RR
extended to  HH deposits;
generally enforced; FX
deposits included in early-
94; govt. deposits exempt
5  Refinance  window  for ST at the discount rate  as of 1995 - weekly
introduced in 92;  auctions  refinancing  auctions are
started in 92,  rates can not  held
fall below discount rate;
limits on each bank's share
in auction credit
and  not  used.  A very short
Rediscount/Lombard  term and collateralized
facilities  emergency facility
introduced in 92
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  primary market
bonds  started in 3/94
68RUSSIA
Country  Table
Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A. DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed credits  used intensively  declining importance  directed credit under
for various sectors  since 94  10%  of total  in the first
half of 95
......................................................................  .......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................
2  Credit ceilings  quarterly ceilings on CB  ceiling on the CB's NDA
credit to DMBs since  in 94
93;  reasonably enforced
in 94
......................................................................  .......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................  ................
3  Interest rate controls  on  Savings Bank rates  all controls  on DMB  market determined by 95
commercial  bank  fixed  and  25%  rates lifted  except for
deposit/lending  rates  limit  on lending  Savings Bank in 1/92
rates in 91  and a margin for
directed credits ......................................................................  .......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  with  Savings Bank  raised to  10-15%  2/95 adjusted to  10-22%
exempt introduced  according to maturity  in
in 91 at 2%  2/92; to  15-20%  in
4/92  including Savings
Bank
......................................................................  ......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................  ...............  ................
5  Refinance  window  introduced in 91  liquidity refinancing at  auctions introduced  in
?? rate started in 92  2/94
and  Lombard expected end
Rediscount/Lombard  95
facilities
6  Gov't and CB bills  and  introduced in 91;  6/94 emergence of a
bonds  negligible amounts  secondary market;




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  not used
2  Credit  ceilings  bank-by-bank  ceilings
introduced  1/91 and
terminated  in 92;
reintroduced  1/93 and
largely  eliminated  in 12/94
...................................................................  ...................................  .........................  . ...... ............................................................  ..................................................................................................................
3  Interest  rate  controls  ceilings  on lending  rates  market determined  since
on  commercial  bank  introduced  1/91; abandoned  4/92
deposit/lending  rates  in 4/92
...........  ................................................  ...................................................................  ........................................................................................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 90, 16-18%
on all deposits but not
effective; 2/92 lowered  and
differentiated  2-9%;
continuing  difficulties w/
compliance
..................................................................  ...................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  introduced  91;  auctions  introduced  in early  after 12/93 mainly
preferential  refinance  92  auction based  w/
for exports and  occassional  suspensions
agriculture  important  in
93
and  introduced  93  since 12/93 fully
Rediscount/Lombard  developed  at 1  % above
facilities  auction rate
6  Gov't  and  CB  bills  introduced  early 92  secondary  market  trade  since early 95 active
and  bonds  dominated  by CB  OMO  w/ CB  bills
70SLOVENIA
Country Table
Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  not used
2  Credit  ceilings  used only in 10/91
...............  ....................................................  ...................................................................  ............................................................................................................................................
3  Interest  rate  controls  not used
on  commercial  bank
deposit/lending  rates
....................................  ...............................  ...................................................................  ...........................................................  ................................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
...................................................................  ...................................................................  ........  ....................................................................................................................................
4  Reserve  requirements  relatively  low and stable
since 2/92; 12/6/2/1/0
according  to maturity
detailed FX cover
regulations
...............  ....................................................  ...................................................................  ............................................................................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  in 92-93 special  liquidity
credits for 3 troubled
banks
...................................................................  ..............................................................  ..... ................................  ...........................................................................................................
6  Rediscount/Lombard  introduced  10/91 but  lombard  introduced  7/92
facilities  limited  to 5% DMB  w/ some restrictions
CB  bill holdings
...............................................  ..................................................................................................................................................................................................
7  Gov't  and  CB  bills  gov't bonds
and bonds  introduced?  LC and
FX CB  bills
introduced  in 91
71TAJIKISTAN
Country  Table
Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used  according  to the  used extensively  in 91-95 with
credit plan until 91  interest free credits  extended
to priority sectors  and gov't
........................................................................  .........................................................  ...................................................................................  ..................................................................  ...
2  Credit  ceilings  not used  ceiling  on CB  NDA  but not
observed;  2/95: a 60-day
freeze  on all lending  to the
economy  and  the budget,
followed by bank-specific
credit ceilings ,............................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................  .......  . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3  Interest  rate  controls  92: DMB  lending  rates limited
on  commercial  bank  to 6% over CB  refinancing
deposit/lending  rates  rate; deposits rates  free except
Savings  Bank; loan rates  to
private sector freed in 93
except priority sectors;  95: all
rates liberalized  except those
for relending  directed credit to
the economy
............................................................................  ..................................................  ......  . ................  ...............................................................  .......................................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 1 1/91:1  5/12/
10/0 % depending  upon
maturity; Savings  Bank  exempt
5  Refinance  window  introduced  in 91;  a temporary  liquidity facility
preferential  rates  for  established  in 95 to assist inn
almost  all public sector  case  of large  cash
firms; highly negative  withdrawals;  new currency
in real  terms  introduced  in 5/95
and  not used
RediscountlLombard
facilities




Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used according  to the  new directed  credit policy
credit plan until 92  channels  CB  funds through
banks  at low rates despite
high inflation; decreasing
importance  in 95
2  Credit  ceilings  not used
3  Interest  rate  controls  fixed in 90-91 with a  since 1/92 nominally
on  commercial  bank  3% margin  between  liberalized  rates, but
deposit/lending  rates  deposit and  loan rates  continued  controls  for
directed credit and savings
deposits; lending  rates
capped  at 1  5% in 2/95
..  ...............................................................................  ................................................  .........................................................
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 92 with major  1/96: unified at
exemptions:  DD 15%, TD  11  % on all types of
10%; uniformly  set 20% in  deposits
l 1/93; 2/94 RR
differentiated  and lowered;
increased  in 1/95
5  Refinance  window  automatic  access  for  auctions  introduced  in 8/93;  as of 1/96, all CB
directed credits  at  not successful  due to  refinancing  is to be
concessional  rates  availability  of cheap  channeled  through
financing  auctions
and  not used  rediscounting  possible,  but
Rediscount/Lombard  rarely  done  as a matter  of
facilities  policy
6  Gov't  and CB  bills  and  not used: the CB




Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Use  of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late  Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A. DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
1  Directed  credits  used acording  to  used regularly  in 92-94; DMBs  stopped in
credit plan until 92  required  to lend 10% of their  principle  in 95,
credits  to agriculture  except
occasional  loans
to the budget ................  ........................  ...................................................................................  .................  .............................................................................................................  ................................................
2  Credit  ceilings  10/94 CB  NDA  ceiling
introduced;  also  ceiling  on the
net banking  system credit to
gov't
3  Interest  rate  controls  on  margins  on lending  rates, 3% in
commercial  bank  91; no formal controls  on
deposit/lending  rates  deposit  rates but dominated  by
Savings  Bank  rates; ceiling  on
lending  rates in 94
B. INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 91 at 10% only
on DD; 1/92 raised  to 15%,
weak enforcement;  reset  at
25% in 3/93 w/ better
enforcement;  9/93 temporary
additional  7% RR  introduced;
3/94 lowered  to 15%
.............................................................................................  ..............................  ...................................................................... I.........................................................................................................
5  Refinance  window  introduced  in 91 at  auctions  introduced  in 5/93;  10/94 all
preferential  rates  refinancing  rates  closely aligned  refinancing
with auction rate  became  auction
based
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't  and CB  bills  and  introduced  in 3/95;
bonds  small  volumes;  CB
also  issued  CDs
74UZBEKISTAN
Country  Table
Use of Monetary  Policy  Instruments
Use of Instruments  during  Transition
INSTRUMENTS  Late Socialism  Transitional  Market-oriented
A.  DIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
............................................................................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................  ....................................................
1  Directed  credits  based  on the credit  highly subsidized  rates  for
plan until 92  priority sectors  via DMBs;
directed  credit share  began  to
decline  in 95
................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ........  ...............................
2  Credit  ceilings  not used
............................................................................................................................  .....................................................................................  . ............................................  .....................................................
3  Interest  rate controls  formally  deposit rates  freed in
on commercial  bank  92, except  Savings  Bank; caps
deposit/lending  rates  on loan rates;  subsidized  CB
loans  discontinued  but interest
subsidy  provided  by MoF
B.  INDIRECT  INSTRUMENTS
..............................................................................................................................  ...................................................................................  ...............................................  ....................................................
4  Reserve  requirements  introduced  in 8/91; 15% on DD,
12 % on TD, and  0% on
deposits  more than 3 years;
poor compliance;  in 5/94 RR
increased  to 30% on deposits
less than 3 years  and 10
percent  on rest
...............................................  ...............................................  ........................................................................  ...........................................  .............................  .............................................................
5  Refinance  window  used in conjunction  refinancing  auction introduced  in
with directed  credit  8/93 on a very limited basis;
policy at subsidized  expanded  by 95 but preferential
rates  rates remain
and  not used
Rediscount/Lombard
facilities
6  Gov't and CB  bills  not used
and bonds
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